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EFFECT ON BOTSWANA, LESOTHO\AND SWAZILAND DF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
INTRODUCTION
The Banjul Charter on African and Peoples' Rights Cadopted by
the Organization of African Unity and submitted far ratification
in 1981) is the world's third major regional system for the
advancement of human rights. The first two were the European
(i.e., Western European), based on the European Convention for
1
the Preservation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (in 
force since 1953), and the American, based on the American Convention 
of Hu ma n R i g h t s 2 (in force si nc e 1978). It would be 
difficult to deny that this incipient African system represents 
the boldest experiment of the three, since Africa, in sharp 
contrast to the two other regions, has so little in the way of a 
shared, unified cultural or juridical tradition and also, because 
of its colonial past, so little experience in democratic traditions. 
When one considers in addition the severe handicaps which result 
from poverty and under-development it requires some considerable
effort to be optimistic about the development of a truly effective 
African human rights mechanism. Indeed, as the discussion below 
will bring out in more detail, the internal weaknesses of the 
Banjul Charter are such as to cast a still further pall on the 
orospects for the development of human rights in Africa.
Notwithstanding all of these considerations, however, it would 
be unwise to give in at this still-early stage to undue pessimism, 
for the Banjul Charter has its strengths as well as its weaknesses 
and the presently-existing juridical base on which the Charter will 
operate - i.e., the domestic legal systems of the various African
states - may well be stranger, or potentially so, than many observers
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currently appreciate. Such appears tc be the case, in any event, 
with the three states which are the objects of this present survey: 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. There appear to be shortcomings 
in the law of all three of these, which will require correction if 
they are to adhere to the Banjul Charter. In most cases though, 
the changes which are neected will not be fundamental ones - that is, 
they will not be ones that necessitate basic changes in the very 
legal fabric of the societies in question. They will be more in 
the nature of the correction of scattered shortcomings, as the 
following discussion will reveal in some detail.
The major exception to this last statement is the security 
legislation of the states of Lesotho and Swaziland, which do make 
substantial and unacceptable (from the standpoint of international 
human rights law) inroads into rights protected by the Banjul 
Charter. The most flagrant of these inroads, as the discussion 
below will indicate, are in the areas of arbitrary detention (in 
the case of both Lesotho and Swaziland) and presumption of innocence 
(in the case of Lesotho). Even in these matters, however, the changes 
required will not be ones that go to the very root of the legal systems 
in question. Basically, "all" that would be required would be the 
"simple" repeal of legislation which is superfluous anyway, in the 
sense that it sets up a special regime for certain specific types 
of crime which the ordinary criminal law, in principle, could cover.
The barriers to reform in this area, in short, are political and not 
legal.
Before beginning the discussion of the impact of the Banjul 
Charter on these three countries, it will be necessary to give at 
least a very brief overview of the Charter itself, without any pre­
tence of comprehensiveness. The discussion can then proceed to an 
article-by-article analysis of the substantive portion of the document.
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A. GenEral History and Structure af the Banjul Charter
The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights can hardly be 
said to be the result of any upwelling of pressure from the 
masses of African people, even if those people are seen to be 
the ultimate beneficiaries of the system which the Charter sets 
up. Indeed, it is probable that at the present point in time, only 
the tiniest minority of the population of the continent has even 
so much as heard of the Charter. Rather, the impetus for the 
Charter came from the scholarly elite of Africa, perhaps 
inevitably so. During the 1960s there had been calls from various 
bodies of jurists for an African Human Rights Charter. Then, in 
1969 began a series of seminars on various topics and conferences which 
eventually culminated in the drafting of the Banjul Charter as it 
now stands: the seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions 
on Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa (Cairo, 1969); 
the Conference of African Jurists on African Legal Process and 
The Individual (Addis Ababa, 1971); the United Nations Seminar 
on the Study of New Ways and Means for Promotion of Human Rights 
with Special Attention to the Problems and Needs of Africa 
(Dar-es-Salaam, 1973); the Colloquium on Economic Development and 
Human Rights in Francophone Africa (Butare, Rwanda, 1978); the Third 
Biennial Conference of the African Bar Association (Freetown, 1978); 
and the Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on 
Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa (Dakar, 1979).
This last seminar was the first actual drafting session for the 
African Charter, the result of a decision of the Sixteenth Assembly 
of Heads of State and Government at Monrovia, in 1979. This effort 
was followed up in June 1980 by a ministerial Conference in Banjul 
which completed, the drafting. In the event, however, the Seventeenth 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, meeting later 
that summer in Freetown, did not adopt the draft, for reasons which
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are not wholly clear. In any event, a second ministerial-level 
drafting session was necessary. It met and completed its work, 
again in Banjul, in 1981. The fruit of its work is the present 
Charter, which the Eighteenth Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the DAU adopted at Nairobi later that year, with 
essentially a change of name of the instrument (from "African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,1 to 'Banjul Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights'). The Charter will come into force 
when it has received the ratifications of a simple majority of 
the DAB member states3 (i.e., twenty-six). By 1 September 1982, 
thirteen states had ratified; Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
were not among them.
The substantive portions of the Charter may be said to fall
into two categories which are quite familiar to anyone who has
studied other international human rights instruments such as the
two International Covenants of 1966 (the one on Economic, Social 
i 5
and Cultural Rights,4 the other on Civil and Political Rights), 
the European Convention u.i Human Rights, and the American Convention 
on Human Rights. The first part is an enumeration of the 
substantive rights which the convention is designed to protect; 
while the second sets up the machinery which will oversee the 
operation of the Charter generally. The present discussion will 
concentrate on the substantive rights, as they may one aay interact 
with the legal systems of the three states in question. Nevertheless, 
it is imperative that the importance of the implementation machinery 
not be underestimated, for it is of the very essence of the Banjul 
Charter that what is being created is not merely a statement of 
principles, but also a continuous procedure for their realization.
□ne can even make this point more strongly (anticipating in so 
doing same of the conclusions to be reached below) by stating that 
the defects of the Charter in the area of suDstantive rights are so 
serious that one must regard the implementation aspect as the baldest,
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most innovative, and most promising part of this great experiment.
In particular, the Banjul Charter provides for three basic mechanisms 
for the advancement of human rights: (a) the furnishing of
advisory opinions on the provisions of the Charter (Article A5,(3);
(b) the resolutions of state-to-state complaints (Article A5-53); 
and, most important of all, the receiving of communications "other 
than those of States parties", i_.e_. , from individuals and non­
governmental organizations (Article 55-59).fj Each of these tasks is 
to be carried out by an African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, a group of eleven experts who will sit in their personal 
capacities.
The substantive rights and duties which the Banjul Charter 
enumerates in Article 2 to 29 fall into four categories. First, 
in Article 2 to 1A, are the traditional civil and political rights 
which are so familiar from the Western tradition of individual 
civil liberties. Second, in Article 15 to 18, are rights of an 
economic and social nature. These rights too are now familiar, 
even if they do not have quite so long a pedigree (at least in 
Western society) as the first group. The third category, Article 
19 to 26, represents the most conspicuous departure from other 
human rights instruments which have come before the Charter - it 
is an enumeration of the rights of peoples, as apposed to individuals. 
The fourth part, Articles 27 to 29 (marked out as a separate chapter 
of the Charter) is a list of the duties of individuals.
Before proceeding to an article-by-article analysis of the Banju 
Charter as it may come to affect the legal systems of Botswana, Lesot 
and Swaziland, it is necessary to discuss briefly some of the mare 
salient characteristics of the document as a whole.
g. Same General Points Concerning the Banjul Charter
g
(a) Concerning an African Law of Human Rights
□ne of the most striking paints about Banjul 
(originally African) Charter of Human and Peoples'
Rights is that it contains so little that can be 
considered truly African. Still more surprisingly, 
it omits several matters which one would think are 
of especial concern in the African context. Each of 
these points requires a brief explanation.
First, concerning the 'African' nature, or lack 
of it, of the document. There are two senses in which 
a set of legal norms might be said to be peculiarly 
African in content. One is that it might contain 
principles derived from the customary and traditional 
law of Africa. The second is that it might contain 
matter relating to aspects of African history, society, 
economics, or politics which Africa does not share with 
other regions of the world. Problems concerning colonia­
lism are an obvious example of this latter category.
Regarding the first of these aspects (the incorpora­
tion of principles from the customary or traditional law 
of Africa), the Banjul Charter contains nothing except 
the most token lip service. In the fourth preambular 
paragraph, for example, the states parties take into 
consideration "the virtues of their historical tradition 
and the values of African civilization which should inspire 
and characterize their reflection on the concept of human 
and peoples' rights." Then, in the tenth preambular paragraph,
-  6
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the stated parties take into account "the importance 
traditionally attached to (human and peoples') rights 
and freedom in Africa". In the Charter itself, however, 
these misty generalities find no expression.
It is not difficult to understand why the Charter 
does not go beyond these vaguest of generalities. I he 
variety which may be found in the traditional and customary 
law across the length and breadth of the continent is wide. 
It is true that anthropologists have shown a keen interest 
in these questions, but not with the intention of extracting 
from them principles of law which might be useful in these 
modern, and troubled, times. One might hazard a guess that 
there is a great deal to be discovered in these African 
systems of law which might prove to be of interest. 
Unfortunately any discoveries which may be made in this
area will have come too late for incorporation into the
11
Banjul Charter.
The other respect in which a body of law might be said 
to be 'African' in some meaningful sense is, as noted above 
that it mi gh t concern itself with matters that are 
particularly relevant to the contemporary social, economic 
and historical concerns of the African states. To be 
sure, there are portions of the Charter which are genuinely 
African in this sense. For example, the entire p o r t i o n  
concerning peoples' rights might be said to fall into this 
category. The statement in Article 19 that "thing shall 
justify the domination of a people by another" clearly is 
a reference to the recent colonial experience of the QAU 
member states. There is also the concern in Article 21(5) 
with "foreign economic exploitation particularly that 
practised by international monopolies ", as well
- a  -
as the reference in Article 22(2) to "the exercise of the 
right to development". One could point out that problems 
of colonialism, the activities of multinational companies, 
and underdevelopment are not actually unique to Africa. That 
is true; but the fact remains that it is only the African 
states which so far have embodied their concerns about these 
issues into their regional human rights machinery.
When considered as a whole, however, it is difficult to 
conclude that the Banjul Charter has very much in it which 
is specifically African. It is the mo st sweeping and 
general portions of the Charter, such as those just quoted, 
which manifest a specifically African outlook. They are 
the Charter concerning which, for reasons to be explained 
in more detail below, there is likely to be little in the 
way of litigation before the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights. The more specific parts of the Charter 
(those relating to civil and political rights) together with 
the section on safeguard (i.e., the part concerning the 
structure and activities of the African Commission) are quite 
in keeping with the approach of international human rights 
law generally (that is to say, with the Western legal tradition).
One of the most curious things about the Banjul Charter 
is the number of matters which one would suppose to be of 
particular concern to Africans which do not appear in the 
document. For instance, with the obvious concern (quoted above) 
about the activities of multinational companies, one might have 
thought that the drafters would have been certain to include 
something expressly about the right to form and join trade 
unions. Curiously, they did not, contenting themselves instead 
with providing, in a general way, in Article 10, with a right 
of free association for individuals (provided, that is, that 
they "abide . . .  by the law,"); The right to Trade Unions
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is underdeveloped. Nor could this omission likely have been 
one merely of inadvertence, since the analogous provisions 
on free association in the Civil and Political Covenant, the 
European Human Rights Convention, and the American Human Rights
12
Convention all expressly mention the right to form trade unions.
Another matter which one might have thought uould be in the 
minds of African drafters is the utterly indefensible restric­
tions in the Republic of South Africa on the inter-marriage 
between the various racial groups. Yet the Charter contains no 
express mention of any right to marry and found a family. Once 
again, all three of the instruments just cited contain such a 
right.
One might have thought as well that another matter strikingly
relevant to the African context would be the rights of minorities,
since so many African states, as a legacy of boundaries inherited
from their colonial past, contain minority groups. Also, it
would appear that in a document which lays a great stress, as
will be discussed below in greater detail, on the rights of
peoples, nothing could be more natural than to include provisions
13concerning minority groups.
Yet another particularly African problem, again stemming from
the colonial past, is the lack of deep-rooted, defined, traditions
associated in the West with the guarantee of human rights (e.g.,
stable parliamentary democracy with periodic elections, and the
like). Very early in the period of independence, many scholars
appreciated that problems of executive rule during states of
emergency would be an important issue for Africa. This concern
1A
found ample expression in the Law of Lagos of 1961. It may be 
noted in passing - and with no small tinge of regret - that in 
terms of the development of a truly African law of human rights,
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As a final example of what might be thought to be
human rights concerns of a truly African nature, but
which find no reflection in the Charter, one can turn
to those human rights-related experiments and innovations
which some African states have undertaken, the most notable
(at least in the Southern African sub-region) being the
15ombudsman systems of Zambia and Tanzania. The Charter 
contains no reference at all to such devices.
(b) Derogation from human rights standards under Banjul Charter
This topic is one which is so important as to merit a
brief discussion on its own. One of the most critical
weaknesses of the Charter lies in the fact that it makes
no express provision for derogation from the rights provided
for in case of an emergency. This omission is puzzling
as well as unfortunate, since (as noted above) the drafters
of the Law of Lagos as long ago as 1961 had given special
16attention to this problem.
In the international Law of Human Rights, it is 
generally conceded that restrictions on normal rights are 
permitted when "a public emergency which threatens the 
life of the nation" (in the words of Article A of the 
Civil and Political Covenant) occurs. The danger, though, 
is very great that states will use the supposed existence 
of such an emergency to engage in a general crack-down 
on human rights. To guard against that possibility, human 
rights instruments like the Covenant on Civil and Political
the Law of Lagos is a much more sophisticated and
perceptive document than the Banjul Charter of twenty
years later.
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Rights, the European Human Rights Convention, and the American 
Human Rights Convention contain certain safeguards. Article A, 
for instance, of the Civil and Political Covenant reguires that 
a state of emergency must be officially proclaimed, and that 
the government concerned must at the same time inform the 
Secretary-General of the UN, and all other states parties of 
the existence of the emergency. It also stipulates that dero­
gations are allowed only "to the extent strictly reguired by 
the exigencies of the situation ___ " Finally, and most
important, it specifies a number of rights from which no dero-
17gation is permitted in any circumstances whatsoever.
The absence of even such modest safeguards as these from 
the Banjul Charter is unfortunate enough in itself, but even 
more so in light of the fact (to be discussed below) that there 
is concrete evidence that serious abuses of human rights are 
in fact occurring in the state of Lesotho (and no doubt in many 
others in Africa as well) under the umbrella of the country's 
sweeping security legislation, the basic provisions of which 
have been set out above. It is to be greatly regretted that 
the drafters of the Banjul Charter apparently failed to appreciate 
that states of emergency and times of concern about internal 
security generally are the times when human rights stand most 
in need of protection.
C. Potential Implications for Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
of adherence to the Banjul Charter
Having discussed some of the more salient points concerning the 
Banjul Charter as a whole, it is now appropriate to begin the 
more detailed and specific exploration into the impact which 
the Charter might come to have on the state of human rights 
in the three Southern African states of Botswana, Lesotho, 
and Swaziland. There has already been a general description
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□f the legal - and particularly the statutory - state of affairs 
in each of these countries. The approach in this discussion, 
therefore, will be to proceed through the Banjul Charter more 
or less article by article, discussing problems that might arise 
in any of the three states vis-a-vis each article. The discussion 
will then proceed to, and conclude with, a similar analysis of the 
implications for the three states of adherence to the two DIM 
Co/enants; - the one on civil and political rights, and the other 
on economic, social, and cultural rights.
Article 2 and 3 of the Banjul Charter are both guite reasonable
and comprehensible when taken alone; but in combination they present
something of a puzzle. Article 2 concerns, basically, non-discrimination
in the en j o y m e n t  of the rights and f r e e d o m s  (not the du ti es
it might be noted) "recognized and guaranteed" in the Charter.
Article 3 then goes on to provide for eguality before the law and
egual protection of the law generally. One would think that the
Article 2 right would included within the Article 3 right, and that
19Article 2 accordingly would be unnecessary. Be Nthat as it may,
Articles 2 and 3 provide very little guidance on tfie subject of
how the law is to treat the bifurcated legal system which prevails
20in the three states, as discussed above. Do these two articles 
mean that the customary court systems, to which the European- 
descended portions of the population do not have access, will have 
to be disbanded? In this connection, it might be recalled that the 
Law of Lagos did recommend the customary law of the African countries
be administered by the ordinary courts, although it did not recommend
21that the substance of that customary law be abolished.
In this connection, one wonders whether the Swaziland case of
22Ross-Spencer and Another v. Master of the High Court would come 
out any differently if the standards of Article 3 applied to it.
That case concerned the non-discrimination provision (section 15)
- 13 -
of the Swaziland constitution (in force at the relevant time).
The Swaziland constitution, in contrast to the Banjul Charter, 
did not provide in an unqualified way for the right of equality 
before the law: it had an exception, in section 15(A), for laws
which, even though they discriminated in some way, were "reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic society"- The specific question in the 
case was whether a Swaziland statute which exempted the estates of 
Africans from death duties was so justifiable. The conclusion 
of the Court of Appeal (reversing the lower court) was that this 
differential treatment was justifiable in light of fact that the 
country comprised "classes or groups of people living under different 
social or economic systems"- In short, it was held not to be contrary 
to the ethos of a "democratic society" to treat differentially groups 
of people which in real sociological, cultural, and other respects 
truly were different. The law should not be blind to social realities.
It is submitted that a different result would not be called for
under the Banjul .Charter, notwithstanding the apparently more absolute
character of the norm concerned. The reason for so supposing is that
the Banjul Charter, it must be recalled, emphasises the inter-relation
between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic,
social, and cultural rights, on the other hand. The precise nature
23of this inter-relationship will be discussed more fully below.
Here, it need only be pointed out that the intersection between the 
two does not consist, as many scholars appear to suppose, of two 
sets of rights battling one another for supremacy. It is more fruit­
ful to view the economic and social sides of issues, as in this case,
not as a rival set of rights to the civil and political rights, but
rather as an aspect of the factual substratum to which the civil and 
political rights are applied. Uhat is at stake in this case is not
so much the "right" of Africans to be treated differently from
Europeans in the area of taxation, as the reasonableness of allowing 
certain socio-economic facts to express themselves in legal terms in 
the way in which they did in this case (i.e., as tax exemption for 
Africans).
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Torture and Other Farms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
□r Punishment (Article 5 )
In terms of written law (i.e., statutes and, in the case of 
Botswana, the constitution), the three states under considera­
tion would have no changes to make in order to conform to Article 5.
In the area of case law, though, the position should be 
different. There is no guestion at all that it is wrong for 
state officials to engage in practices of the kind named in 
Article 5. There is some guestion, however, as to how the 
state should react to cases where such conduct on the part 
of its officials does occur. In particular, the guestion 
arises with some freguency of what to do about evidence or 
information which the police have gained by the use of 
excessively harsh interrogation techniques.
The basic approach of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Proclamation of 1983 (which, applied to all three territories 
and continued in force in each after independence) is a good 
one. It clearly states, in section 223, that when confessions, 
of defendants are sought to be admitted as evidence in criminal 
prosecutions the state must as a matter of course prove beyond a
24reasonable doubt that the confession was made freely and voluntarily.
If the defendant can so much as raise a reasonable doubt on that
subject, then the judge hearing the case must exclude the confession 
25from consideration.
Unfortunately, the protection provided far persons in police 
custody is far from total. For one thing, there is an exception 
to this rule spelled out in the Proclamation itself: that if a
defendant points out or reveals the whereabouts of something as 
part of a statement which is otherwise not admissible as evidence 
in court, then evidence of that painting out may still be used in 
court.^
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A more serious problem is that the protection which is afforded
to defendants by section 223 of the 1938 Proclamation does not
extend far enough beyond the bounds of the courtroom and its own
procedures, as was made abundantly clear in the case of Botswana
27by the case of State U. Bitsang Bagwasi and Others. The defendant 
in that case was charged with murder. He alleged that he had been 
assaulted by the police. The court did not believe that claim, 
although it did find that the police had used undue influence.
In the course of its judgement, however, the court noted that it 
was permissible for the police to make use of all of the "tricks 
of the trade", including the use of prolonged interrogation, for 
the purpose of investigating the crime, even though the evidence 
so obtained could be admitted in courtroom proceedings.
It is submitted that this approach is excessively cautious
in light of the fact that the torturing and mistreatment of persons
in detention is one of the most serious of all human rights abuses.
The extent to which it occurs in the three countries is, not surpisingly,
a matter of considerable uncertainty; but there is no question that it
has occurred. Lesotho would appear to be mast culpable of the three
states in this respect, if one judges by the number of cases in which
allegations of mistreatment and undue influence have been made and
established (established, to the extent of warranting the exclusion
of evidence gained by the police). It has also been Lesotho, though,
in which the judges have taken it upon themselves to make suggestions
28to the police on how to deal with the problem. The police have not 
yet availed themselves of the advice. As a matter of fact, the position
of detainees in Lesotho is now more precarious than ever, with the
29introduction of the Internal Security (General) Act '1982. The older 
security legislation entitled magistrates to visit detainees at 
least once a week, thus providing a means (not very frequently used 
in practice, it would appear) of ascertaining the health of persons 
in detention. Under the new law, however, this function has been
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given instead to a different group of persons known as "advisers", 
who are not part of the independent judiciary but rather are the 
appointees of the minister of the government responsible for 
internal security.
It is submitted that in order to give full and effective 
implementation to the Article 5 prohibition of torture and other 
forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, states parties 
to the Banjul Charter should be required to ensure that effective 
mechanisms exist whereby the treatment of persons in detention 
is made subject to impartial observation. On that test, the 
provisions in the 1982 Lesotho security legislation for "advisers" 
would be inconsistent with the Charter.
Similarly, the Botswana law as set forth in the Bitsang Bagwasi 
case should be deemed to fall short of the Charter requirement, to 
the extent that it deems "high-pressure" police interrogation 
techniques, such as prolonged interrogation, to be lawful, even if 
inadmissible in courtroom proceedings.
The law of Swaziland, too, must be held to fall short in this 
respect. One should take note here of the case of Rex M. Jabulani 
Shiba,^concerning the admissibility of statements which the defendant 
in a murder trial made to a Senior District Officer. The statements 
were made after a prolonged interrogation over some two or three days. 
The court did not believe that there had been any undue influence 
exerted on the defendant and admitted the statements into evidence.
If only for the purpose of guarding against possible undue influence 
or mistreatment by the police, the fruits of such prolonged inter­
rogation should be excluded.
Another indication that the courts in Swaziland sometimes have 
had a relaxed attitude towards this kind of case may be found in the
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rather peculiar case of Rex U. Sibbcsane and Another, in which 
a defendant alleged that he had been assaulted by the police while 
in detention before making his statement to a magistrate. In the 
course of a separate hearing into the admissibility of the statement, 
the defendant admitted that the statement which he had made was 
true, even though (according to him) it had been coerced by the police. 
The court held that this last statement was admissible, thereby 
rendering it unnecessary to rule one way or the other on the admis­
sibility of the original statement - a question "best not put
the court concluded. The basic issue here is whether evidence
32gained (or allegedy gained) as a consequence of police pressure 
should be excluded if it comes to the attention of the court 
indirectly (as in this case), as well as if it comes directly (i.e., 
if the statement is given to a magistrate immediately following, 
and as a direct consequence of, the police tactics). It is submitted 
that, again in the interest of fully and effectively protecting the 
rights of individuals under Article 5 of the Banjul Charter, such 
indirect fruits of police pressure should be excluded from evidence 
in court.
Perhaps the ultimate examples of cruel and inhuman treatment 
of detainees at the hands of the police are deaths in detention 
and disappearances of persons from police custody. Deaths in 
detention in questionable circumstances are reliably known to have 
occurred in Lesotho, but there have been no formal court proceedings 
concerning them. The legal provisions for the holdings of inquests 
in such cases in Lesotho appears to be frozen. In 19B2, however, 
there was a noted case concerning a disappearance, Mary Khalane 
V. Commissioner in Charge of Police, Minister in Charge of Police 
and Solicitor-General. ^  The disappeared person had last been seen 
in police custody. The police claimed to have released him, although 
the court did not find their evidence credible and ordered them 
to produce the person. They never did so. So far, the victim has 
still not been found; but at least the police in Lesotho are now on
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notice that the courts are not afraid to be fiercely critical 
and rightly so - in cases of this kind.
Another area in uhich possible infringements of Article 5 
of the Charter might arise is in the sentencing of convicted persons, 
especially the infliction of corporal punishment, which has been
held to be in contravention of the European Convention on Human
3ARights. The three states under analysis presently have nothing to 
compare with the so-called "Islamic punishments" of stoning or 
amputation; but they do all have provision for the infliction of 
strokes for cerrain offences. In this regard, the courts of the 
three countries have displayed a curious blend of firmness and
leniency. On the side of firmness, there is the Botswana case of
35State 17. Keakitse, concerning the sentencing of a fourteen-year 
old boy who had been convicted at first instance of theft and 
sentences to two strokes with a light cane. The appellate judge 
thought that in the circumstances, a sentence of six strokes was 
more appropriate, because it was important to impress upon the 
minds of such young people as the defendant that the law was not 
something to be trifled with."^
That case, however, was exceptional. In other instances, courts 
have been concerned not so much to increase the severity of a sentence 
as to ensure that it be carried out promptly. The justification given 
in one Lesotho case for this policy was that corporal punishment
37could not be an effective deterrent unless it was administered promptly. 
One might also note, though, that punishment which is promptly admini­
stered has the advantage for the recipient of avoiding any psychological 
stress which may be caused by anticipating the punishment for a long 
period of time.
On the side of leniency, it should be noted that the courts of 
Lesotho and Swaziland at least, have introduced a number of judicial
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restrictions into the use of corporal punishment. In Lesotho,
the courts have placed extra-statutory restrictions on the
39subjection of persons over thirty to whipping. In Swaziland,
it has been held in one case that the number of strokes should
ACnot usually exceed six. Another case has held that strokes
should not be administered on more than two occasions to any 
A1
one person. Another case has stated firmly that strokes are
A2never an appropriate punishment for a minor traffic offence.
The question to be answered in this area is whether this 
line of prevailing case law is generally adequate in terms of 
the letter and spirit of Article 5 of the Banjul Charter, or 
whether the Charter will, or should, require the total abolition 
of judicial corporal punishment, as the European Human Rights 
Convention effectively has done. In this respect, though, it 
must not be forgotten that the Banjul Charter is an African 
Charter of human rights, and that the ideas of Europe may well be 
different in such an area as this from those of Africa. One 
must, of course, always be careful that such an assertion not be 
allowed to degenerate into a mere platitude which will serve as 
an automatic excuse for the violation of rights which could 
not otherwise be justified. Here, however, such may not be the 
case. It should be borne in mind that the state of under-development 
of many African states is such that they are unable to afford the 
kinds of services (such as supervised probation) which are part 
of the stock in trade of the criminal courts of the developed 
Western world. There can be little question that in an ideal world, 
there would be no place for judicial corporal punishment. In the 
present circumstances, though, it is submitted that it cannot be 
dogmatically said that judicial corporal punishment per se 
violates Article 5 of the Banjul Charter. The better approach 
would be to hold that it would so violate the Charter if it 
were given with any other purpose in mind than the rehabilitation 
of the recipient. It would also be desirable to establish the 
principle that only in the most exceptional circumstances should 
corporal punishment be administered to an adult.
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The Right to Liberty and Security and Freedom From Arbitrary Arrest 
and Detention (Article 6)
Three principal types of detention exist in the laws of the three 
countries being considered: detention under the ordinary criminal 
law, which under the law of all three states (deriving from the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Proclamation of 1983) may last 
for no more than forty-eight hours; detention under the internal 
security legislation of Lesotho for up to forty-two days on 
suspicion by the police of involvement in subversive activities; 
and detention in Swaziland, under the 1978 detention order, for 
up to sixty days (renewable indefinitely) on order of the Prime 
Minister. Clearly, there is great scope under these last two 
pieces of legislation for the governments of the two states
concerned to subject their citizens to arbitrary arrest and
I. .. A3 detention.
It is greatly to the credit of the courts of both of those
states, that even in the face of very restrictive legislation and
in the absence of written constitutions, they have continued to
insist that they have a role to play in the safeguarding of the
rights of individual detainees. One device which the courts in
both countries have used is the rigorous scrutiny of the process
of the delegation of authority under the security legislation.
In the Swaziland case of Lialker and Forbes U. Commissioner of
Police, Attorney-General and Superintendent of Matsapha Central 
AA
Prison, the court upheld the lawfulness of the detention, but at 
the same time it strongly asserted its right to pass on the legality 
of any alleged delegation of the power to order detentions. The 
basic principle that it announced was that any duty "which in the 
nature of the subject matter and the language of the section (i.e. 
of the King's Order-in Council (\Jo.1 of 1973) can only be properly 
exercised in a judicial spirit" cannot be delegated, in the 
absence of an express authority so allowing (no such authority being 
present in this case). Subordinate persons, on the other hand, could be
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entrusted with the task of executing detention decisions made by 
the proper authorities.
The subject of the delegation of powers also figured in the
45
Lesotho case of Mpiti Sekake U. Rex, which concerned the validity 
of orders restricting a person under the Emergency Regulations of 
Legal Notice l\lo.5 of 1970. Here, there was no doubt that the 
minister could delegate his power to detain, the question being 
whether in fact he had done so. The court found no mention of any 
such delegation in the Government Gazette, so it set aside the 
detention order.^
The landmark case in Lesotho, however concerning the powers
of courts to supervise the detention process is Sello U. Commissioner 
U1
of Police and Another. The detainee in that case had been arrested 
for the purpose of interrogation concerning some subversive activi­
ties about which the police believed that she had some knowledge. After 
approximately two days of periodic interrogation, she fainted and 
collapsed and was removed to hospital (still under police 
custody). After her discharge, she was placed back in detention.
The case in question concerned a petition asking the respondents 
to show cause why the detainee should not be released, or to establish 
that they had not assaulted her, or that they had not interrogated 
her during her stay in the hospital. The petition also sought a 
private interview with the detainee, and a medical report.
The respondents' contention was that the court had no jurisdic­
tion to order the release of the detainee. They also claimed that 
the two documents which the court had before it - a medical certi­
ficate from the hospital, and a statement obtained by a magistrate 
were not admissible in the proceedings, on the ground that they 
had been obtained in contravention of the then-prevailing security
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legislation. On the admissibility of the documents, the courts 
held against the respondents: concerning the statement given to 
the magistrate, on the ground that the magistrate's interview 
with the detainee had been perfectly lawful and that it was quite 
natural that he would take notes during it; concerning the hospital 
report, on the ground that during her stay in the hospital, the 
person was not in detention within the meaning of the legislation 
and that the police had consented to access to her by the hospital 
staff.
Concerning its jurisdiction to order the release of the 
detainee, the court firmly held that the security legislation had 
not established any presumption of the lawfulness of a detention, 
that the onus was on the police to establish on a balance of pro­
babilities, that the arrest and detention were lawful. It also 
held that the legislation had not taken away the right of detainees 
to contest the lawfulness of their detention; nor had it purported 
to take away the right of the courts to pass on that legality.
"Unless .... parliament says so in clear and explicit language,
there is never a presumption in favour of invading the individual's 
AB
rights." In bold and ringing language, the court announced its 
attitude towards infringements on the rights of individuals:
It is the main function of the Courts in our Kingdom to 
protect the rights of an individual. It is equally the 
function of Parliament. If these rights are infringed or 
curtailed, however slightly, . . . our Courts will jealously 
guard against such an erosion of the individual's rights.
Any person who infringes or takes away the rights of an indivi­
dual must show a legal right to do so. The rights of an 
individual being infringed or taken away, even if a legal 
right is shown, needs the Courts to scrutinize such legal 
right very closely- If it is an Act of Parliament, the Courts 
will give it the usual strict interpretation in order to see 
whether the provisions of the said Act have been strictly 
observed. If the Courts come to the conclusion that the 
provisions of an Act are not being strictly observed then 
the detention of the detainee would be illegal and the Courts 
will not hesitate to say so. A9
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In cases which have been handed dawn in Lesothc since Sello,
the courts have continued to condemn police methods which have
unduly infringed the human rights of citizens. Even more, they
have shown themselves willing to look behind the tactics of the
police to ensure that police action which nominally was within
the law was not being used in fact to circumvent that law. In
the case of Mahlasi Letsie U. Commissioner of Police and Solicitor-
50General, concerning the repeated detention and release of a 
person. The court in effect accused the police of playing a cat- 
and-mouse game, of releasing the detainee as soon as legal pro­
ceedings appeared imminent, in order to avoid having to pay damages 
to detainees whose treatment had been in violation of the procedures 
set down in the security laws.
Faced with this difficulty the court said the respondents 
simply release the detainee and virtually say that the 
applicant should be satisfied for, after all, that is 
what he wanted to achieve viz. the release of the detainee 
from detention. But in bringing about the release of the 
detainee resort had to be had to the due process of the 
law and in that process costs were incurred. 51
The court went on to award costs tQ the applicant.
Another important Lesotho case concerning detention under the
security laws was Lebenya Makakole U Commissioner of Police and 
52Solicitor-General, which afforded a classic example of the extreme 
powers of the police in the security area "spilling over" into the
investigation of really what were ordinary criminal offences (suspected
car theft, in this case). The court had this to say on the matter:
I think we are here witnessing a classic example of 
an abdication of powers .... and chaos taking over.
What an ordinary citizens fears most is in fact taking 
place: an abuse of the law is now at work. The law is
being used, not for what it was meant but for something
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else. Ordinary police investigating methods which of 
necessity are difficult and tiresome have been abandoned 
and the much fearsome sick detention law is being readily 
substituted. Citizens are detained, not because they have 
committed or are about to commit offerees relating to 
the security of the State . . . but because a citizen 
is suspected of being a petty car thief. 53
Boldness may not be enough, however, because the courts do not at
present have at their disposal any external standard against which
the "lawfulness" of a statute itself can be tested. Also, the
possibility is not to be excluded that, with the example of the
Terrorism Act of South Africa before them, the governments of
Lesotho or Swaziland might some day act to deprive the courts
even of the ability to decide upon the legality of action taken
5Aunder the security legislation. Lesotho has not (yet) gone so
far but it is of some interest to note that in two respects the
new security legislation of 1982 reverses the Sella decision.
55first, (as noted above), it precludes there being any magistrate's 
statement to rely upon, since the role of the magistrate has been
replaced by that of the adviser, who is appointed by the minister
55
in charge of security. The second change, for the worse, made by 
the 1982 legislation is section A0(A), which states that a person 
who is sent to a hospital while under either an interim custody 
order or a detention order shall be deemed to be still in custody.
Another device which the Lesotho courts have used to attempt 
to temper the rigours of the security legislation is to take the 
fact of detention into account in assessing the credibility of 
any evidence which the detainee might eventually give. An example 
of this approach may be found in Rex U. Tumelo Sising and Others, 
in u»hich the court stated somewhat cryptically: "It would be unreal
for any court in Lesotho to pretend that it was unaware of the political
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situation as it is at present". The court then went on to note:
Persons detained under this legislation cannot hope for Release 
unless they satisfy the police that they have given all the 
infoimation required. It cannot be a pleasant experience for any­
one to be so detained and such a person may well wish to avoid 
its recurrence. A court must take into account, in evaluating 
the testimony of witnesses, that all or any of these factors 
may be present in their minds when they give evidence.
As for the question of whether the adherence of Lesotho or 
Swaziland to the Banjul Charter will make very much real difference, 
the answer must be, at this stage at least, that it probably would 
not, for the reason that the Charter itself is unfortunately rather 
weak in this area. To state, as Article 6 does, that "no one may 
be arbitrarily arrested or detained" is a fair start in the protection 
of the human rights of detainees.
As for the question of whether the adherence of Lesotho or 
Swaziland to the Banjul Charter will make very much real difference, 
the answer is that it might, depending on what kind D f  interpretation 
eventually emerges to some unhappily cryptic language in the Charter. 
The bare statement in Article 6 that "no one may be arbitrarily 
arrested or detained" is certainly a step in the right direction, 
but possibly no more than that. At the risk of jumping slightly 
ahead in the Charter, we might note that in Article 7, there is at 
least a possibility of something more hopeful. Article 7(1) gives 
to every individual the right "to have his cause heard." It then 
goes on to enumerate (as the discussion below will set out in more 
detail) a number of rights which are obviously relevant to criminal 
trials. Yet the word "cause" might envisage something broader thar 
an ordinary criminal prosecution. Support for such a thesis is 
found by comparing Article 7 with the corresponding provisions of 
the Civil and Political Covenant of the UN, the European Human Rights 
Convention, and the American Human Rights Convention, each of which
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expressly refers to criminal proceedings. Surely, it would be 
argued, a person who is detained under the Lesotho legislation 
for being "concerned in subversive activity" has a "cause" to be 
heard, even if he is not a defendant in an ordinary criminal 
proceeding.
If such an interpretation were to be given to Article 7(1),
then the ratification of the Banjul Charter by Lesotho might
indeed make a substantial difference to persons detained. It
would give them the right not merely, as presently, to contest
the legality of their detention - i.e., to test whether their
detention was in compliance with the legislation (however harsh
it may happen to be); it would give them the additional, and
invalLBble right to contest the substantive question of whether
their detention was or was not really necessary for the protection 
57of national security. It is submitted that only by adopting such 
an interpretation of Article 7(1) can a truly effective safeguard 
of the Article 6 right to be free from arbitrary imprisonment be 
achieved. It is to be deeply regretted that so important a right 
is effectively hidden away in such murky phraseology.
Rights of Defendants in Criminal Proceeding (Article 7)
Right to be Presumed Innocent (Article 7(.1)(b)
In the law of all three states under study, there are difficulties 
concerning this most fundamental of rights of accused persons. The 
right was enshrined in all three of the independence constitutions, 
although always with the proviso that there might still fall upon 
defendants an onus of proving "particular facts" thence. It is sometimes 
no easy matter where the proving of "particular facts" ends and where 
the proving of innocence per se begins.
- 27 -
The most common area in which this tender problem arises 
is that of stock theft, a matter of considerable importance in 
these three countries whose rural economies continue to have a 
significant pastoral element. The three countries have all 
inherited as one of their legacies from the period of British 
rule the Stock Theft Proclamation of 1921, which provides that 
if a person is found to be in possession of stock which may 
reasonably be suspected to have been stolen, then that person 
is guilty of an offence _if he is unable to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of how he came about such possession. The position 
is that first, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the possession was unlawful (in the sense just described); 
if it is successful, then there arises on the part of the defendant 
the onus of establishing, on a balance of the probabilities, that 
he came about his possession by lawful means. Does this onus on the 
defendant amount to a violation of the presumption of innocence?
There are two general lines of argument that may be advanced 
to the effect that it does not. The first would hold that the 
general requirement of a presumption of innocence does not preclude 
requiring defendants to prove certain facts on a balance of probabi­
lities (never beyond a reasonable doubt), especially facts which are 
uniquely within the knowledge of the defendant, such as how he came 
into the possession of some head of cattle. For some express support 
of this position, one need turn no further than the three constitu­
tions of the countries under consideration - all three contain 
express guarantees of the presumption of innocence; and all three 
also provide explicitly that that guarantee does not preclude a 
defendant's being obligated to prove "particular facts". While 
it is true that a principle of this kind could eat away the major 
principle of presumption of innocence if courts and legislatures 
do not prove sufficiently watchful, the limitation is that this 
burden of proving "particular facts" must not be allowed to extend 
to the point that it substantially relieves the prosecution of its 
basic duty of proving its entire case beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The second line of argument to the effect that this kind of 
onus on defendants is not inconsistent with a presumption of 
innocence is a good deal more subtle, but it is worth considering 
because it is the one which the courts of Botswana and Lesotho 
have relied upon (the Swaziland courts not having had the occasion, 
apparently, to consider the question squarely). This approach 
draws a distinction between two kinds of presumptions: on the one 
hand, that which causes upon a defendant the burden of establishing 
some fact; and, on the other hand, that which serves to create a 
substantive legal offence. The former type, it is conceded, does 
entail the risk of transgressing the principle of the presumption 
of innocence. The latter does not.
A number of cases in both Botswana and Lesotho have arrived 
at the conclusion that that the provision in question of the Stock 
Theft Proclamation does not create a presumption of theft on the
part of the defendant, but rather creates, in the words of one Botswana
58case, "a subjective offence". A Lesotho case stated the same basic 
conclusion in slightly different words by stating that the provision
in question "does not set out a mere rule of evidence but constitutes
59a special category of theft". Put at its simplest, what the Stock 
Theft Proclamation section does is to transmute the substance of 
the offence itself - such that the gravamen of the offence becomes 
no longer theft as such, but rather the failure to provide a satis­
factory explanation for unlawful possession.
It is submitted that both of these lines of argument should be 
rejected, the first on grounds of vagueness, and the second on grounds 
of sophistry. It is true that it is passible to make an intellectual 
distinction between presumptions which operate purely on the factual 
side and those which create substantive offences. The similarity 
between the two types, though, would appear to be of decidedly greater
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importance than their difference, since both operate in fact to 
place a burden of proof on defendants on a crucial point in the 
prosecution's case. In any event, the creation of substantive 
criminal offences by presumption rather than by direct legisla­
tion would seem to be something that should be avoided.
The Right to Defence (Article 7(1)(c))
There appears to be no difficulty in any of the three countries 
under study with this provision, provided of course one assumes 
that a trial does in fact take place. Problems in this area 
lie not in the denial of the right to a defence at a trial which 
does occur. The problem lies rather in the refusal of the govern­
ment to hold a trial at all in cases relating to internal security. 
As this matter has already been discussed under Article 6 above, 
there is no need for further analysis here.
The Right to be tried within a reasorable time (Article 7(1)(d))
The right of defendants to be tried without "undue delay" is one 
which appeared in all of the independence constitutions of the 
states presently under consideration. The right continues to 
enjoy constitutional protection in Botswana, although it might be 
noted that it has been held in that country (in the case of State 
U. Merriweather Seboni) ^  that a defendant whose right has been 
violated is not thereby entitled to have the proceedings in his case 
declared null and void.
In Lesotho, even though the constitution has been suspended, 
the judiciary has shown concern on a number of occasions about 
inordinate delays both in bringing defendants to trial in first
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instance and in the hearing of appeals. So it is apparent that
the right to be tried within a reasonable time still is in existence
there, even though the basic machinery of protection is not the 
written constitution but rather the inherent power of the courts 
to ensure the general fairness.
For a striking illustration of how unfair it can be on defendants
to have to prove "particular facts" D f  a certain kind, one could
turn to Part II of Lesotho's Internal Security (General) Act 1962.
The offences which are created by that portion of the act do have
an element of mens rea to them: that is, they require some degree
of knowledge or belief or intention on the part of the defendant, in
addition to the physical performance of some activity. Under the 
statute, however, this mens rea element typically is presumed to 
be satisfied unless the defendant proves the contrary. In some 
instances, though, the presumptions in the prosecution's favour 
extend to the commission of the act itself. Section 12 on sabotage, 
for example, states that "In a prosecution for an offense under this 
section, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that 
the accused wilfully acted or omitted to act as alleged against him."
A provision more flagrantly contrary to the normal human right of 
presumption of innocence could scarcely be imagined. Similarly, 
in section 20, concerning unauthorised entry or presence in a pro­
tected place, the accused person is presumed, unless the contrary 
is proved, to have had no permission to do the act alleged.
In this area, then, it is probable in the case of all three 
countries - and certainly in the case of Lesotho - that changes 
will have to be made in various domestic laws in order to conform 
to the Banjul Charter.
In Swaziland, the position appears to be basically the same 
as in Lesotho, although there is less case law on the subject. One
r
might note in passing the case of Rex \l. Twala, which held that
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a delay of five months between the commission of the offence 
in question and the trial of the defendant was not unreasonable.
The law of the three countries, then, is basically in accord
with the Article 7(1)(d ) requirement of trial within a reasonable
time although there is no doubt that the actual practice of the
judicial machinery sometimes falls short of what the domestic
law requires. There will, then, be room in principle for claims
against the three states under this Article of the Charter. There
is unlikely to be any great rush of claims, though, in light of
the requirement of Article 56(5) of the Charter that domestic
remedies first be exhausted before filing a communication with
the African Commission. Domestic remedies do exist, even if only
in the form of reducing sentences in cases of inordinate delay in
62bringing defendants to trial.
Right to trial by an impartial court of tribunal (Article 7(1)(d))
In none of the three countries being considered has there been 
any serious allegation of unfairness on the part of the courts. 
Threats to the independence of the judiciary do exist in the 
countries, as the discussion below will indicate.^ There is no 
indication, however, that these threats have led to any bias in 
the actual trial of cases.
Trial and punishment under retroactive laws (Article 7(2)
There has not been a difficulty in this area in any of the 
three states under consideration. Therefore, ratification of 
the Charter should pose no difficulties on this count.
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Punishment to be personal only (Article 7(2))
There are indeed problems in this regard in all three countries - 
problems, in fact, which raise questions about the Charter 
which are of the very highest importance.
It is clear that one purpose of this article is to rule out 
collective punishment - the punishment of a group of persons
for an offence committed by one or more (but not all) of its 
members. That subject presents no great problem. There is, however, 
much difficulty in determining whether exemplary punishments are 
caught by this section.
It is possible, ana,it is contended,(necessary as well) to 
distinguish two different issues here: one which might be termed
problems of general deterrence, and the other which might be 
labelled specific deterrence. General deterrence would refer to 
the practice of giving out particularly heavy sentences for those 
crimes which are on the increase, in order to warn potential 
future offenders that a dire fate awaits them if they are caught 
doing the same thing, the clear implication being that otherwise 
the defendant would have received a lighter sentence. liJhat has 
been termed specific deterrence, on the other hand, is punishment 
which is oriented towards the protection of some specific activity 
which is deemed to be particularly worthy of protection by the 
courts irrespective (within broad limits at least) of how prevalent 
offences against that protected activity might be.
There is a reason for making this distinction, which might 
appear at first glance to be an excessively fine one. The essential 
difference lies in the predictability for the potential wrongdoers 
of the consequences of their actions. In the case of specific
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deterrence, the sensitive activities would be identified and known 
to the defendant before he embarked on his career of crime. Such 
would not be the case in matters of general deterrence, however, 
defendants would be incurring the risk that, at the time of 
sentencing (not even at the time of the commission of the offeree) 
there might be an increase in the type of crime which he has
committed). Or what would amount in effect to the same thing,
that there might be perceived or believed to be such an increase 
over which the defendant had no control and which he could not 
possibly have foreseen.
This distinction is perceptible in the case law of both
Botswana and Lesotho, but not Swaziland. It is only in Botswana,
though - and even there only recently - that courts have indicated
that they might be prepared to treat the two types of exemplary
6A
sentence differently. The recent case of Jaba \J. State may
prove to be of some importance in this regard. The defendant in
that case was convicted of the offence of concealing a birth and 
was given a harsh sentence for the reason, as expressed by the 
magistrate who heard the case, that "offences of this nature are 
becoming far too prevalent". The appellate court noted that the 
magistrate did not reveal his source of information on this point 
and reversed the sentence downwards. It gave as the reason that it 
was not fair to a defendant to rely on the frequency of commission 
of an offence as a basis for punishment without revealing one's 
source of information. It is difficult, though, to see how the 
unfairness to the defendant could really lie in the failure of the 
magistrate to reveal his source of information. Surely the unfair­
ness to the defendant really lies in the fact that he is being 
exposed to sentencing on the basis of information which may not 
ever have been available to him. Even if such information was 
available to him, he would have had no reliable way of knowing 
that a court would rely on it when sentencing him. The potential 
importance of the case lies, then, not in the quality of its reasoning,
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but rather in the fact that it does recognise, if somewhat clumsily,
the awkwardness of sentencing defendants on the basis of facts that
might well have been utterly irrelevant to the defendant's own actions.
Things are otherwise, though, in the case of what has been 
labelled above as specific deterrence. In particular, and wi.th 
the sanction of the constitution, the Botswana courts have been 
much more tolerant of exemplary sentencing for the protection
65
of the country's diamond industry. The case of State V G. Ikanyeng, 
concerning sentencing for unlawful diamond possession, held that 
"it is necessary for the court to show its disapproval of a course 
of conduct which would have the tendency of ruining the economy' 
of the country " pDr constitutional support, albeit only of an 
indirect kind, one could look to the concern for the diamond 
industry in the portion of the constitution relating to searches.
Section 9 of the constitution allows some derogation from the 
normal rules regarding searches of persons, provided that the 
measures taken are "reasonably required in the interest of .. the 
development and utilization of mineral resources" and are also 
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society".
The courts of Lesotho have been consistently tolerant of 
exemplary sentencing, having stated an several occasions that it 
is permissible for courts to take account of the prevalence of
67the offence in question when sentencing a convicted defendant.^
So it should scarcely be surprising to find the courts looking
with favour on harsh treatment of persons whose offences are
damaging to the national economy. The following language from the
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case of Fano and Another 11. Rex, concerning the theft of govern­
ment property, is instructive:
It is the primary duty of every court in this land to mark 
their determination to discourage any idea that Government pro­
perty can be stolen with impunity . . . .  The courts therefore 
are determined to punish severely anyone who steals Government's
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propety. Lesotho is a poor country and has, of necessity to 
borrouj money from donors. If the little help we receive is 
not used for the purpose for which it was meant but finds its 
way into the pockets of individual officers, then very soon this 
country will find it increasingly difficult to raise any loans. 
This is haw serious the crime which the appellants have committed
(sic). It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to put a stop
to this menace before it brings about the serious conseguences 
just alluded to. 69
The case law in Swaziland is rather scantier on this subject, 
although the general principle seems to be established that it is
not wrong to pass sentences on individual defendants which are
intended to have the effect of conveying a warning to society at 
large about the courts' attitude towards the offence in question.^
It remains to be decided how the Banjul Charter will treat 
this subject, whether it will adopt what might be termed the 
strong or the weak interpretation of Article 7(2) - the weak 
interpretation (from the traditional Western civil libertarian 
perspective, that is) being that Article 7(2) requires no more 
than that punishments should be inflicted solely on the persons 
who actually commit and are convicted of the offence in question; 
the strong interpretation being that Article 7(2) goes further 
and requires that any sentence which is passed on the defendant 
shall be no more than is thought reasonably necessary to deter 
that individual person, and not society at large, from committing 
the offence. When the issue is stated in this way, it becomes 
apparent that it represents a sharp clash between Western-style 
notions of civil liberties, with their powerful orientation 
towards the rights of individual persons; against an approach which 
many in the Third World and in the socialist countries would find 
more attractive i.e., that the interests of the society as a 
whole should be paramount.
The solution to this dilemma, if indeed there can ever be one, 
is more likely ± d  emerge from the general sociological and juridical
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milieu of the African countries than directly from the text of 
the Banjul Charter. The Charter does offer certain clues, however, 
chiefly in the clear indication afforded by Article 29 that the 
interests of the individual are subordinate to those of the state 
in a wide variety of fields. It is submitted that the best 
approach for the courts to take in this area would be that which 
has been foreshadowed by the courts in Botswana as outlined above: 
that exemplary sentencing not be allowed in circumstances in 
which defendants could not reasonably have been expected to fore­
see that it would be used, but that it should be allowed in certain 
types of offences in which the economic (or other) stakes for the 
country as a whole might be reasonably said to be high. One could 
take this line of reasoning aliyhtly further and hold that the 
optimal solution would be far the government to state in the most 
conspicuous way possible, in advance, what areas exemplary sentencing 
would be permitted in. The most obvious mechanism would be to 
publish such announcements in the government Gazette. If the policy 
of the government were thus clearly set out, it could then be 
challenged more effectively than is presently the case, either 
through domestic constitutional procedures (as is still possible in 
the case of Botswana) or, it would be hoped, through the machinery 
of the Banjul Charter itself.
If this suggested approach were to be followed, then the law 
of Botswana would be broadly in line with the Charter. That of both 
Lesotho and Swaziland would require changes, although not (it is 
submitted) of a very fundamental nature. The present sentencing 
practices of the courts would have to undergo a modification; but 
the only legislative change that would be required would be the 
adoption of enabling legislation to allow the designation (subject, 
it is hoped, to challenge) of those areas deemed sensitive enough 
to allow of exemplary sentencing.
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Freedom of conscience and religion (Article 8)
In this area, the three states under consideration have nothing
to fear from ratification of the Banjul Charter. None has any
undue restriction an the practicing or the profession of religion,
nor have there been major incidents of religious persecution or
discrimination in any of the three. None of the three is a one-
party state (officially at least), and so there have been no
problems with such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses, which refuse
as a matter of the highest principle to take any part in secular
political life and who accordingly have been the victims of
71persecution by some governments, notably those of Malawi and 
Zambia.
The right to receive information and to express and disseminate 
opinions (Article 9)
This area of freedom of expression is another one in which the 
courts of the three countries have been vigorous champions of 
civil liberties, in the very face of some rather intimidating 
legislation. This point, taken in conjunction with the fact 
that the Banjul Charter is either, at best, poorly drafted or, 
at worst, useless, would lead one to conclude that ratification 
of the Charter is unlikely to have very much practical impact 
on the law of the three countries.
Firstly, concerning the Banjul Charter provision itself. 
Article 9(2) is something of a mystery in that it only provides 
for the right to express and disseminate opinions "within the law". 
It is submitted that this article simply cannot mean what its 
literal interpretation would seem to suggest - that individuals 
have the right to express their opinions only to the extent that 
"the law" (presumably the domestic law) allows. Such an interpre­
tation would render the purported right completely illusory. It
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would do no more than to"guarantee" that persons were entitled 
to do that which the domestic law allowed them to do, a "guarantee" 
for which there is precious little need for international protection.
The only reasonable interpretation of Article 9(2) is that 
"the law" which is referred to cannot be the domestic law of the 
country concerned, whatever that law might be. It must refer to 
laws which are reasonably necessary for the orderly regulation 
of the manner in which the right of expressing opinions is exercised. 
The reference, then, would be to such laws as those relating to the 
holding of public meetings, or to the expression of opinions in 
such a context that a breach of the peace would be a likely 
consequence.
There is always the danger, of course, that such laws as those 
just mentioned would be drafted so as to sweep too broadly. The 
problem here,however, is not really a legislative one, or at least 
not jniquely so, since it is impossible to imagine that a statute 
on this kind of subject matter could ever be drafted so precisely 
as to farsee and penalise all, but only, those activities in which, 
say, breaches of the peace were genuinely likely to occur as a 
result of a vigorous exercise of the right of liberty of expression. 
What is essential in this area is that a watchful and truly independent 
judiciary constantly guard this sensitive juridical outpost.
The three countries under consideration have had quite a fortunate 
history in this respect. In all three, the courts have shown great 
tolerance and understanding in dealing with cases relating to such 
matters as sedition and incitement to dissaffection and the like.
The discussion will briefly point out some examples of the courts' 
approach in these areas, and then turn to the special area of 
contempt of court.
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Botswana has several provisions of its penal code which make 
inroads into the unbridled expression of opinions, one of which
is section 1BA, concerning the use of "insulting language".
72 73It was held in the cases of State U. Conde and State I/. Mosweu
that in order to succeed in cases of this kind, the prosecution
must establish that the language is likely to induce a breach
of the peace. The court emphasised that the section is not to be
used to deny freedom of expression or on a slightly more mundane
level) to punish the use of vulgar expressions uttered for the
relief of stress.
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Another interesting Botswana case was State 11. Bontshetse,
in which the defendant used insulting words against the President
of the country and was then prosecuted for "offensive conduct
conducive to breaches of the peace"* He was acquitted, as the
court found that in the circumstances there was in fact no such
danger. The defendant had expressed his opinions in his own
home before his guests, who became embarrassed and left without
creating any disturbance. Another case which considered this
75general issue was State V. Lebuku, concerning a defendant who, 
in the course of an election campagn in Botswana, made a number 
of vulgar and insulting comments about the state of morals of 
members of the ruling party. He was convicted at first instance 
of using "insulting language . . . likely tD give such provo­
cation to any person as to cause such a person to breach the 
peace . . . "  Bn appeal, the conviction was reversed, on the 
ground that the defendant's diatribe had been merely annoying 
to those to whom it was directed. There had not in fact been 
any serious likelihood that it would provoke the listeners to 
commit a breach of the peace.
There have been prosecutions under this same section of 
the Botswana Penal Code for the stirring up of racial hatred.
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The tuo major cases in this respect are State \J. Violet □ Connell
77and State U. Arnold, both concerning the use of the expression
"kaffir". In both cases the defendant was convicted. The O'Connell
court was prepared to take judicial notice of the special meaning 
which that word had come to assume, something which the Arnold 
court was not prepared to do. In the Arnold case, the court 
concluded that what it was really dealing with was a drunken 
incident in which it was not clear that any true insult was 
intended. It accordingly reduced the fine which the lower
court had imposed, although it allowed the conviction to stand.
Similar cases under similar legislation, with similar results
78have come down from the courts in Lesotho. In Mpiti Sekake V. Rex,
the defendant was being prosecuted under the Internal Security
Act 1967 for using language likely to provoke another person into
breaching the peace. The defendant had delivered a vituperative
speech criticising another person, comparing the instance to Eve
in the Garden of Eden. In the course of holding that this activity
would not actually be expected to provoke a breach of the peace,
the court stated that "one should be careful not to fix a standard
which would unduly limit freedom of speech and the right to
criticise or to impose conditions or restrictions that are too
narrow and which would make such charges convenient catch-all
79against speakers with unpopular views".
in Swaziland, the record is somewhat more mixed, although
there too the courts have generally inclined in favour of liberty
of expression, interpreting potentially repressive legislation
strictly and giving defendants the benefit of the doubt. One
apt illustration of this approach is the case of Rex V. Gilbert 
00
Sikela Shabangu, concerning a defendant who referred to the King 
of Swaziland as "excreta", thereby earning himself a prosecution 
under the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act of 1938. The Act
76
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punished speech which brought the King into hatred or contempt 
or sought to incite dissaffection against him. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the language used by the defendant was held by the court to have 
done none of these things, although the outspoken gentleman was 
not so fortunate as to go entirely unpunished. He was found 
guilty of a lesser offence: the use of insulting or defamatory 
language, under the Crimes Act of 1889.
0 1
The Swaziland case of Kinnear \J. Rex was very similar.
There, the defendant called the King a monkey and, like Shabangu, 
was prosecuted under the Sedition and Subversive Activities Act 
of 1938, for incitement to dissafection. The court held that he 
did not intend to incite to dissafection. It went on, however, 
to find that he did intend to bring the King into contempt, i.e., 
that he was guilty of sedition.
A final illustration of the approach of the Swaziland courts
02in these matters is the case of Akbar Badat V. Rex, which was 
similar to the cases mentioned above from Botswana and Lesotho.
The defendant was being prosecuted under the Urban Government 
Regulations of 1969 for calling another person a "bloody barking 
bitch" and a "fucking Bushman". Although the language used 
certainly was offensive in the extreme, the appellate court 
set aside the conviction at first instance, on the ground that 
there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace occurring, as 
the regulations required.
In conclusion, then, it is difficult at this stage to believe 
that the approach of the courts of any of the three states would 
need to change markedly in this area of liberty of expression, for 
two reasons. First, because the courts in all three states (perhaps 
Swaziland somewhat less than the other two) have proved themselves
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to be willing to scrutinize with some care prosecutions and 
convictions which take place under legislation restricting free 
speech. Second, as noted above, it does not appear that the 
Banjul Charter itself offers very substantial protection in 
this area.
Before leaving this subject, it is worthwhile taking note
03of the special problem of contempt of court.
In the area of contempt of court, there would appear to be 
some risk that Lesotho might fall afoul of the Banjul Charter, 
judging from the approach which the High Court adopted in the 
case of Maseru United Football Club \!. Lesotho Sports Council 
and Others. Some litigation had taken place, in which the 
losing party felt very aggrieved indeed, to the point that it 
wrote to the Foreign Minister and also to the press alleging 
bias and corruption on the part of the judges in language which 
the court held to be too virulent and intemperate to qualify 
as fair comment. LJhat is remarkable about this case was the 
insistence of the courts that the truth or falsehood of the 
accusations made was of no relevance - that kind of criticism 
of the judiciary was simply wrong per se. The court held that 
the prime object of the contempt proceedings would be defeated 
if the court were compelled to embark on an investigation into 
the underlying facts. It may be the case, as the court held in 
its judgement, that the balance of authorities supported that 
approach. If so, then (it is submitted) the balance of authorities 
is inconsistent with the Banjul Charter. It is difficult to 
believe that the mere insulting of the judicial system from afar 
(i.e., in a context in which there is no substantial likelihood 
of interfering with the hearing of matters in progress) should 
not be the object of contempt of court proceedings. The judicial 
system should never set itself as being above criticism of even 
the most vigorous variety. And above all, there would seem to 
be no justification for courts' absolving themselves on principle 
from looking into the facts behind a matter before them.
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The court in Botswana took a distinctly more relaxed view
of the subject of contempt of court in the case of State V.
35Kynoch in regard Ipeeng, concerning some remarks made by 
a disgruntled complainant in some litigation. He had stated 
at one point that "The law is not prepared to protect me and 
I might be killed"- He was cited for contempt at first instance, 
but the citation was reversed on appeal, on the ground that 
the statement was a mere outburst from a person whD was in an 
angry mood and averse to the reconciliation process. He was 
not necessarily making an allegation of partiality on the part 
of the judiciary with an intention to insult. This case, of 
course, concerned quite different circumstances from those in 
Maseru United Football Club. So the only conclusion (and 
necessarily a tentative one at that) is that the Botswana 
courts seem generally more willing to tolerate criticism than 
their Lesotho counterparts. The Botswana approach would seem 
to be more in harmony with the norm of liberty of expression 
generally than the Lesotho one, although it would be unwise 
to attempt to draw very firm conclusions from the scanty case 
law presently available on the subject.
The right of free association (Article 10)
It had been pointed out above that, although the general 
right of free association is protected in the Banjul Charter, 
there is no express mention of the right of persons to form or 
even to join trade unions. The general position in the three states 
under consideration regarding trade unions has been set out above 
and need not be repeated here.
There has been very little domestic litigation in any of 
the three countries concerning the right of freedom of association.
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The nearest that the courts of any of the three have come, apparently, 
to dealing with the question is the Lesotho High Court case of 
Mokhahlane U. Minister in Charge of the Public Service and the
" “ Qg
Solicitor General, concerning a civil servant who had been 
dismissed and was seeking re-instatement. The technical grounds 
for his dismissal were that he was unfit for his duties, and 
that the public interest required his dismissal. He alleged 
that the dismissal had been for reasons of suspected disloyalty 
and for alleged consorting with subversives. The plaintiff 
successfully won re-instatement although the grounds were technical 
ones relating to civil service discipline and dismissal procedures, 
rather than more substantive ones relating to freedom to associate 
with alleged subversives. So the case is of little assistance in 
the human rights area.
As none of the three states considered here is officially 
a one-party state, there has been no problem in any of them with 
compulsion to join an association, as provided for in Article 10(2). 
Accordingly, the reference in that article to "the obligation of 
solidarity" of Article 29 is of no obvious relevance.
The right of free assembly (Article 11)
As thprp has apparently been no case law development in this area,
87there is nothing further to add here.
Freedom of movement (Article 12)
None of the three states in question has any significant restrictions 
□n freedom of movement of their nationals, apart from restrictions 
on certain areas, such as military installations, for defence purposes.
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In this respect, there is some potential for abuse, however. In 
Lesotho's Internal Security (General) Act of 1982, for instance, 
the minister in charge of public security has an apparently 
unrestricted right to designate any place in the country as a 
protected place. It would appear unlikely, though, that this 
power would be used to the extent of seriously restricting the 
right of the public to exercise their right of free movement 
around the country of the type which Article 12 envisages. The 
article seems directed against such phenomena as excessive or 
unreasonable restrictions on the right of persons, say, to move 
their place of residence from rural to urban areas. There are 
some states in Africa with restrictions of this sort which 
might be deemed violative of Article 12; but the three states 
under consideration here are not among them.
The part of Article 12 which has caused some difficulty, 
in Lesotho at least, is Article 12(3), giving to every individual 
"the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other 
countries in accordance with law of those countries and interna­
tional conventions." As is the norm in international instruments 
relating to asylum, there is no positive obligation on the part of 
the receiving state to grant asylum, but merely a right on the 
part of the individual to seek it and to benefit from it if it 
is so granted. The obligations on the part of the state, if any, 
derive not from the Banjul Charter, but rather, (as Article 12(3) 
states) from its own domestic law and from any international obliga­
tions which it might have assumed other instruments.
00The case in Lesotho, Joseph Molefi \J. Government of Lesotho, 
is a landmark case in the interpretation of the 1951 UN Convention 
on the 5tatus of Refugees. It concerned the question of whether 
Mr. Molefi did or did not qualify as a refugee within the meaning 
Of that convention. The plaintiff had left South Africa undoubtedly
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for political reasons, in the early 1960s. The question was not 
whether he had the required "well-grounded fear of being persecuted" 
by the South Africans should he be returned there, but rather 
whether his departure had been "as a result of events occuring 
before 1 January 1951", as required by Article 1(A)(2) of that 
instrument. The plaintiff's contention was that even though 
his physical departure from South Africa had only taken place 
in the 1960s, still it was as a "result", within the meaning 
of the convention, of events before 1951 - the events being the
early measures towards apartheid adopted by the National Party
government consequent upon its assumption of power in 19A8. The 
essence of the case was the question of how far back in the chain 
of causation of events the courts would be willing to go in their 
determination of causes and "results", the plaintiff's contention 
being that the courts should look to the entire web of events
which causes a person to flee a country, and not only to the
proximate causes. The courts in Lesotho disagreed, as did the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England, to which 
an appeal was taken in the matter.
It is hardly surprising that the courts were unable to take 
so broad a view of the question as the plaintiff would have liked.
A more interesting issue for present purposes, though, is whether 
things might have been different in any important way had the 
plaintiff been able to rely upon the Banjul Charter. The question 
is really one of conflicts of laws between international instruments, 
a largely unexplored area of international law. The potential 
dilemma for a state like Lesotho is that it will find itself doubly 
bound, in a sense, to an instrument like the Convention on the 
Status of Refugees: once in terms of that convention itself, of
course; and then, a second time, in terms of Article 12(3) of the 
Banjul Charter. Will there, then, be two bodies with the authority 
to decide upon the nature and extent of the obligations assumed 
under the Convention - i.e. the International Court of Justice
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under Article 38 cf the Convention, and also the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples' Rights, under the Banjul Charter? What will 
happen if the two bodies should disagree? Presumably the African 
Commission would defer to the International Court on the matter, 
not because the International Court is an intrinsically superior 
but rather because, in terms of the 1951 Convention itself, it is 
the body which is charged with the task of interpretation.
The risk, then, that states parties to the Banjul Charter 
might expose themselves to inconsistent obligations in the arEa 
of refugees and asylum is probably more theoretical than real.
The right to participate freely in the government of one's country 
(Article 13)
In this area, Botswana at least has little to worry about. Such 
is not the case, however, with the other two states under study. 
Lesotho at the present time does not have free elections, although 
it has had an interim parliament since 1973. The same situation 
broadly holds true in Swaziland, which has had a post-1973 coup 
parliament since 1978, although no true free elections.
It might be doubted, though, whether Article 13(1) truly
requires free elections in the sense in which, say, Western
89Europeans or Americans would understand that term. It is true 
that representatives, if such be the method of participation, 
must be "freely chosen", but it is also true that free choice 
is to be "in accordance with the provisions of the law".
The same considerations arise here as those which were 
considered in connection with liberty of expression in Article 
9(2). It is submitted here, as there, that this qualification
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cannot be interpreted so as to confer onto the state party an 
unrestricted right to enact any law which it pleases on the 
subject. The governments of the states parties are entitled 
to fix the procedures according to which the free choice will 
be exercised - and note that it need not be through LJestern- 
style formal elections. They cannot, however, take measures 
which will place undue limitations on that choice itself. A 
state, for instance, can decide on the qualifications of electors, 
but not in such a way as effectively to disenfranchise all who 
are likely to vote against the ruling party in an election. It 
is entitled to decide on the method of counting of votes, but 
not in such a way as to deprive opposition parties of any 
opportunity to scrutinise the fairness and honesty of the 
count.
In the case of Lesotho, it is said that the government 
has plans for the holding of an election. If so, then it may 
be that Lesotho will shortly be in compliance with Article 
13 of the Banjul Charter. In Swaziland, the prospects for 
an early free election are unclear. In any event, as developments 
stand at the present time, both states will need to make substantial 
changes before they can be said to be in compliance with this portion 
of the Banjul Charter.
The right to property (Article 1A)
This provision is in many ways the most remarkable in the entire 
Banjul Charter. It seems little short of extraordinary that 
in a continent which has ostensibly been so strongly influenced 
by socialist concepts, and so much the victim of an economic 
order based firmly on the rights of private property, this right 
would be so firmly provided for. This right does not appear at 
all in the Ul\l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is
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present in both the European and the American Convention on
Human Rights, although in each case in a rather less absolutist
sounding form than appears here. The First Protocol of the
European Convention, for instance, states, in Article 1, that
each person is entitled to "the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions" - there being actually no mention of any "right 
90of property" as such. The American Convention does at least 
mention the word "property," in Article 21; but what it protects 
is not something called the "right of property" in the abstract 
butbut rather the slightly more down-to-earth-sounding "right 
to the use and enjoyment of . . . property."
What the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
will make of this provision in the course of its activities 
will be very interesting to observe. IMor is it likely that, 
once the Charter comes into force (assuming, of course, that 
it does), the Commission will be able to duck the issue for 
long, since it would seem quite likely that persons filing 
communications with the Commission will be able to seize upon 
this provision in a wide variety of contexts, most obviously 
to challenge nationalization and collectivization programmes 
of various kinds.
In all events, at the present time it would not appear 
that any of the three states being studied would need to make 
any substantial changes in their domestic laws to comply with 
this article.
91The economic, social and cultural rights (Article 15 to 16)
It is frequently said that whereas the developed Western states 
are principally concerned in the human rights area with civil
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and political rights (broadly, of the type just discussed), the 
developing world is more interested in economic, social and 
cultural rights. If repetition alone could make allegations 
come true, then that proposition would long ago have become 
established in the firmest way. A study of the Banjul Charter, 
however, reveals surprisingly little support for this claim.
The economic, social, and cultural rights which find 
protection in the Charter, as a matter of fact, are essentially 
confined to four: the right to work; health (both physical
and mental); education (including participation in the 
cultural life of one's community); and the protection of the 
family. LJith the exception of Article 17(1), on the basic 
right to an education, the rights which are provided for in 
these three articles are of a general enough nature that it 
would scarcely be possible to make a clear finding that a 
state had infringed them (or, to use what is perhaps a more 
appropriate expression, failed to provide them). This genera­
lity carries one important advantage and one disadvantage 
(which might or might not be perceived as important). The 
advantage is, in a word, realism. Most countries of the 
world, and almost all which are members of the OAU (and hence 
eligible to become parties to the Banj.ul Charter), are poor 
countries which are attempting to develop themselves under 
massive pressures and handicaps from all quarters - domestic 
and international (international concerns being particularly 
important for the states of Southern Africa which perforce 
must pass their entire existence under the influence of the 
Republic of South Africa), political and economic. To suppose 
that they are capable of granting the full array of economic 
and social rights at one fell swoop would be unrealistic.
They can be expected to attempt, within the constraints under 
which they suffer, to achieve these rights progressively;
- 51 -
but it would be unrealistic to expect more. Article 16(1) 
provides an illustration of this realistic approach, in its 
provision not for physical and mental health in an absolute 
sense (if indeed any such thing exists, even for the wealthiest 
of countries), but instead for "the best attainable state of 
physical and mental health".
The disadvantage of this generalist, relativist approach 
to economics, social, and cultural rights is that it is almost 
impossible to say with any certainty if the rights are or not 
being granted. Is a state in which A0% of government spending 
is devoted to the military really doing the best it can provide for
the health of its citizens? There is equal uncertainty on the
procedural side. Is it to be expected that the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights actually will make judgements of 
the kind just referred to? Needless to say, the problems of 
enforcing any such findings by the Commission might prove very 
serious.
It would appear much more likely that the African Commission 
would take the approach that what the economic, social, and cultural 
provisions of the Charter require is that each state make a con­
scientious, good-faith effort to grant the rights in question, 
and that any applicant (whether it be another state party or an 
individual or group) alleging a violation on a state's part would 
have the burden of proving bad faith - a burden which would be 
virtually impossible to meet.
This approach would be quite a sensible one, although there 
may be some who would be disturbed at the fact that it would seem 
to amount in practice to the setting up of a kind of two-tier human 
rights system. The one tier would be the civil and political rights,
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which would be the subject of litigation procedures before the 
African Commission quite similar in nature to those under the 
European and American Human Rights Conventions. The second 
tier would be the economic, social, and cultural rights, which 
would effectively not be subject to adjudication (save for 
the extremely limited exception just posited, of proving lack 
of a good-faith effort on the part of states parties) and therefore 
would remain as pious expressions of hopes for the future.
Such a state of affairs may not be intrinsically so 
undersirable. After all, it would have the virtue of reflecting 
in a realistic way the very different nature of political and 
civil rights on the one hand, as opposed to economic, social, 
and cultural rights on the other hand. The pioblem is, though, 
that people might begin to wonder what had become of the ringing 
assertion in the seventh preambular paragraph of the Charter, 
that "the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is 
a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights"- What 
the "African" Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights would then 
amount to would be only an imitation of the basic European 
pattern, in which civil and political lights were fully enforceable 
at law, and economic, social, and cultural rights not.
It is submitted that the true difficulty here lies in the 
tendency of many scholars to fall into, the very traps which they 
purport to avoid: in this case, the error has been to assert
the interdependence of the two classes of rights in one sense, 
while at the same time accepting, even assuming, the existence 
of a sharp dichotomy in another sense. This point requires a 
word of explanation. The seventh preambular paragraph states 
clearly enough that "civil and political rights cannot be 
dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their 
conception as well as universality . . . . " T o  hold, however 
firmly, though, that two things "cannot be dissociated" is at
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the very same to assume the fact that these two things really 
do exist, and as separate things at that, in at least some sense.
The basic problem here is that the two things in question 
(.the two categories of rights) are in real’ity pnly one thing.
Or rather, two different aspects of one "thing". To think first 
of economic, social, and cultural rights as being different in 
kind from civil and political rights, and then to claim that 
the two cannot be dissociated comes perilously near to being 
a contradiction in terms. The more fruitful approach would be 
to iftuist, as the Western civil libertarian tradition has not 
always done, that the economic and social aspects of civil 
libertarian questions always receive their proper share of 
attention.
The courts of Southern Africa have already been adopting
an approach something like this one, as the discussion above on
exemplary sentencing indicated. One can find further instances
of the sensitivity of the courts to social and economic issues
within the broad framework of what would traditionally be labelled
as civil and political issues. One interesting example in this
92respect is the Lesotho case of Raliqo Montsi \J. Rex, which 
was a rape case, in which a very harsh sentence was being imposed 
upon the convicted defendant. The harshness of the sentence was 
justified on the fallowing grounds:
Consider the situation in this country. The majority 
of the men in this country go to the Republic of South Africa 
to seek employment. Due to circumstances not of their making, 
their wives remain behind. Again, most men come to the big 
centres such as Maseru to seek employment and due to sociolo­
gical problems their wives remain behind. It is these women 
who are most vulnerable. They must be protected and the 
courts will do so with utmost vigour. Accused persons who are 
found guilty of this heinous crime must not expect any mercy 
from our courts ..... The courts mean to crush this menace
Here, as in the case of exemplary sentencing discussed 
above, the problem is the extent to which the legal system 
should let its views of economic and social reality lead to 
the abridgement of what might other-wise be considered the 
fundamental rights of individuals. It is in cases like this 
one that the real inter-connection between civil and political 
rights on the one hand, and economic, social, and cultural 
rights on the other lies "hidden"- Scholars have too long 
been entranced by the superficial picture of the two categories 
of rights arrayed against one another like conceptual armies 
doing glorious battle for the juridical soul of mankind. The 
way to a true appreciation and development of economic, social, 
and cultural rights does not lie in the expectation of a grand, 
cathartic duel between the two in the conference halls and seminar 
rooms of the scholars of law, sociology, economic^, and no doubt 
many other disciplines as well, to grapple with the hard, specific 
issues as they emerge from the day-to-day lives of the people of 
Africa. The sweeping assertions of international conferences 
should be the last step in this difficult process, not the first.
The final observation that may be made in connection with the
economic, social, and cultural rights is that the one area in which
the states in this study clearly need to do more is in the .area
of discrimination against women. There has been practically no
9Acase law on the subject in any of the three states.
The rights of peoples (Article 19 to 2k)
As noted above, this is the portion of the Banjul Charter which 
differs most obviously from any other human rights instruments 
presently in existence. Unfortunately, the drafting has not been 
exactly a model of clarity.
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The mast obvious weakness is the lack of any attempt to 
explain just what is meant by the term "peoples." It is clear 
that the term is not synonymous with "states", but apart from 
that conclusion vagueness and uncertainty reign. The chief 
question which must be answered is. does the expression 
"peoples" refer to the population of a state, or can it refer 
to, say, an ethnic group, or a religious-group, or a social 
class? In other words, is it correct to say that the popula­
tion of, say, Zimbabwe constitutes a "people," but that the 
Shona do not? It appears that such is the case, although this 
conclusion is not advanced with any great confidence. The 
basic reason for supposing that the expression "people" refers 
to the people of a state is that if the term included, say, 
tribal groups, then Article 19 of the Charter particularly 
(which states that "All peoples shall be equal ...") might offer 
undue encouragement to secessionist movements. If indeed, all 
peoples are equal, and if the Tswana people have their own 
nation-state, why are not the Ibo people of Nigeria similarly 
entitled to their own nation-state?
It would seem preferable to regard this section of the Charter
on peoples' rights as referring to the rights which belong to the
population of nation-states _en_masse, rather than to individuals
in specific cases. Government are viewed not as the holders of
these peoples' rights, but rather the bodies which have the ability,
the right, and (most important) the duty to see that these peoples'
rights are exercised. For example, Article 22(2) expressly holds that
"States shall have the duty . . .  to ensure the exercise of the right
to development" (a right which the Charter makes not the slightest 
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effort to define).
As far as human rights law is concerned, these peoples' rights 
present something of a difficulty. If they belong only to masses 
of people and not to individuals, then who has the right to take 
action if they are allegedly infringed? The answer, apparently,
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is that any one can dc so. The part of the Charter relating to 
"other communications" (i.e., communications other than those 
from states parties to the Charter) does not place any restriction 
on who may do the communicating (so long as the communication 
itself meets the criterion set forth in Article 56), or to what 
portion of the Charter the communication may relate.
The consequences of this part of the Charter, then, in con­
junction with the right of communication of Articles 55 to 59, 
may be very far-reaching indeed. Consider, for instance, the 
requirement of Article 21 (5): "States parties * . . shall under­
take to eliminate- all forms of foreign economic exploitation 
particularly that practised by international monopolies so as 
to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages 
derived from their natural resources"* Suppose that a state 
enters into an agreement with a foreign oil company, whereby 
the company will search for oil, and in the event that it discovers 
it, will be given certain incentives and other concessions to 
exploit the find. Immediately upon the publication of the fact 
that such an agreement had been reached, some outraged members 
of the political opposition file a petition with the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, alleging a violation 
of Article 21(5) on the part of the state. There could, of 
course, be no question of the petitioners' suing the oil company 
under the Banjul Charter, since the company is not a party thereto.
Such a petition would place the members of the African 
Commission in an interesting position. It would in effect 
transform them into arbitrators of a rather unusual sort. That 
is, they would be passing on the fairness or reasonableness of 
the oil concession agreement, although not in a dispute between 
the parties to that agreement. They would have no power to cancel 
or alter the terms of the concession in the event that they were
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to deem it violative of Article 21(5). They could suggest to 
the state that it either cancel or renegotiate the agreement, 
although to do so might involve the state in a substantial 
damages claim from the company for repudiation.
Note that the example just chosen is a relatively simple
one, because it involves making a decision on a relatively
clear-cut issue. Suppose, however, that the petitioners had
decided instead, or in addition, to proceed under Article 22(2)
instead, and to allege that the state had violated its duty "to
ensure the exercise of the right to develop". This is not the
place to launch into an exhaustive discussion of what the right
96to development is or is not; but for the purpose of pointing 
out some of the difficulties that might be caused by including 
it in the Banjul Charter in this way, it might be useful to note 
a characterisation (not a definition) provided by an African jurist. 
He stated that the right to development "envisages each person's 
quality of life in its totality, for an improvement that takes into
Haccount the choices and means of each individual and each nation •
It will be no easy matter deciding when a state has failed to ensure 
the exercise of that right!
The most probable "solution" to this problem will be, the
same as that posited for the economic, social, and cultural rights
of Article 15 to 18 above: that the states parties will be allowed
98a "margin of appreciation" whose effect will be that any one 
alleging a violation of any of the peoples' rights will have the 
burden of proving bad faith on the part of the state, a burden 
which will be so difficult to meet as to render issues relating 
to such questions as the "elimination of all forms of foreign 
economic exploitation" or the right to development non-litigable.
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It would be greatly desirable, although it is probably 
not now possible, for there to be some clarification of this 
point as soon as possible. The reason is that, as the Charter 
now stands, there is a vast uncertainty as to just what kind 
of obligations states might be assuming in ratifying the 
instrument, and as to what kind of claims might be made against 
them in the future under the communication procedure of Article 
55 to 59. It would be tragic for the fate of the Charter and, 
more importantly, for the future of the people of Africa if 
large numbers of states declined to ratify the Charter because 
of fears, which might well utimately prove to have been groundless, 
about massive claims that might be made against them. Nor can 
there be any effective way of reassuring hesitant states. Since 
these provisions relating to peoples' rights are so utterly without 
precedent, even the world's foremost human rights experts can do 
no more than make educated guesses as to what effect they will have 
in practice.
A final matter which merits discussion in connection with 
the portion of the Banjul Charter on peoples' rights concerns 
the right of peoples "to free themselves from the bonds of domina­
tion by resorting to any means recognized by the international 
community" (Article 20(2). The Charter, in this area, is a bundle 
of contradictions. On the one hand, for example, Article 20(3) 
obligates states parties to assist peoples "in their liberation 
struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic, 
or cultural". On the other hand, though, there is the duty on 
the part of states parties, in Article 23(2) to ensure that "any 
individual enjoying the right of asylum . . . shall not engage 
in subversive activities against his country' of origin or any other 
State part to the present Charter." The use of the term "country 
of origin" is significant, because it would include South Africa
(which, not being an OAU member, is not eligible to be a party to
99
the Charter and therefore could not fall under the rubric of 
state party).
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One wonders in this connection whether the Swaziland case of 
Rex \J Mngomezulu, Malinga, Mwelase and Z u l u ^ ^ would have come 
out any differently had the standards of theBanjul Charter, such 
as they are in this area, been applied to it. The defendants 
were charged with unlawful possession of arms of war and ammuni­
tion. Their defense was that they were members of the Pan African 
Congress (PAC), one of the South African liberation groups, in 
transit to South Africa. They claimed that the Swaziland govern­
ment had authorised their possession, not directly but constructively 
as it were, through Swaziland's membership of the CAU, which 
officially favoured assisting the various liberation groups in their 
struggle against South Africa. Mot surprisingly, the court rejected 
their argument and proceeded to find them guilty.
Assuming that these defendants were not at the time enjoying 
the right of asylum (and that therefore Article 23(2)(a) would 
not be applicable), would Swaziland have violated the Charter by 
dealing with these defendants as it did? If the provision were 
interpreted literally, then it would appear that the case was 
indeed inconsistent with the Charter. It would not be inordinately 
difficult, of course, for lawyers to devise a reasonably plausible 
argument that would support the Swazi decision; but there would 
probably have to be some subtle reasoning involved. Furthermore, 
it might look slightly odd to see the members of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights engaging in legal casuistry 
for the purpose of weakening these provisions of the Charter for 
the benefit of South Africa. One would therefore have to 
conclude that, for the states of the Southern African region 
(including, of course, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), 
ratification of the Charter carries some risk of losing a 
certain autonomy over the operation of their ordinary criminal 
legislation while at the same time being dragged further than 
they might wish into the liberation struggle within South Africa.
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This example provides an apt illustration of how great an error 
it can be to place sweeping phraseology which really is of 
basically a rhetorical nature into a formal legal document.
Such a policy unnecessarily increases the risks and uncertainties 
facing potential states parties, thereby making ratification less 
likely than it otherwise would be and jeopardising one of the 
noblest experiments that humanity has ever launched.
The duties of individuals (Article 27-29)
There is nothing new about the proposition that humans have 
duties as well as rights. As long ago as 19A8, the American
states adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and
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Duties of Man, which had a fairly extensive list of duties 
of various kinds. Uhat is unusual about the approach of the 
Banjul Charter is the extent to which it has embodied a list 
of duties into what purports to be legally binding form.
The American Convention on Human Rights has a chapter on the 
subject, but it consists of only a single article, which (in 
relevant part) holds in a very general way that "Every person
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has responsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind".
The list of duties in the Banjul Charter is a great more 
extensive than that, although not always more precise. One 
might wonder, for instance, what the duty "To preserve and 
strengthen social and national solidarity, particularly when the 
latter is threatened" might mean.
More importantly, though, one might wonder what the legal 
effect of any of this portion of the Charter is. Clearly only 
states, and not individuals, are eligible to be parties to the 
Charter (Article 63(1), so that on general principles of interna­
tional law the Charter cannot create legal liabilities binding on
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individuals. In any event, there could be no question of states' 
complaining before the African Commission that individuals are 
not meeting their obligations under the Charter, since Article 
A 7, on communications from states, envisages only complaints 
by states against other states.
It is suggested that Article 27 to 29 of the Charter are
not, as one might think, altogether devoid of legal effect.
It is still possible that they can have some impact on the
standing of individuals to bring claims against states, i.e.
the Commission may conclude that an individual who has been unduly
neglecting his duties will be disqualified from filing communi-
103cations under Articles 55 to 59. This suggestion must be 
treated with great caution, since there is no support for it in 
those Articles. Also, one would certainly have to conclude that 
it is ineffective to leave important matters of standing to be 
gleaned from the text by guesswork rather tnan stating them 
directly. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what other 
legal effect Articles 27 to 29 could have.
This portion of the Charter would not necessitate any legal 
changes on the part of Botswana, Lesotho, or Swaziland.
The promotion of the rights contained in the Charter (Article 25)
According to this article, states parties to the Charter are under 
the duty to "promote and ensure through teaching, education and 
publication, the respect of the rights and freedoms contained 
in the . . . Charter and to see to it that these freedoms and rights 
as well as corresponding obligations and duties are understood."
Each of the three states under consideration could perfectly easily 
enter upon this obligation without any change in domestic law.
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The Independence of the Courts (Article 26)
There can be few provisions of the Banjul Charter that are more 
important than this one. In the discussion above of the role of 
the courts in Lesotho and, to a lesser extent, of Swaziland in 
cases on detention, proof was given, if any was necessary, of 
the critical importance of a free and independent judiciary.
In this respect, the drafters of the Banjul Charter are to be 
highly commended, as other international human rights instruments 
do not contain a provision analogous to this one. A forward 
stand on this issue may one day be regarded as Africa's most 
significant contribution to the evolution of the international 
law of human rights.
Although there is little actual litigation on this issue, 
it is worth taking note of the form in which threats to judicial 
independence might come. One important mechanism for the elimina­
tion of judges with dangerously independent views is the use of 
fixed-term contracts for judges who are non-nationals of the 
country concerned Ca phenomenon that is far from rare in a continent 
where the after-effects of the colonial era may yet have a long 
life, in the form of legal systems which originally were imposed 
by colonial masters). In the case of expatriate judges, it is 
a fairly easy matter for the government to decide upon the non- 
renewal of a contract under the guise of some plausible-sounding 
excuse. It is no easy matter devising a strategy to meet this 
problem. Perhaps one day a judge whose contract is not renewed 
will take his own matter to the African Commission, although that 
possibility seems somewhat far-fetched. It is possible, though, 
that another body, such as a bar association or any interested 
human rights group could take up such a case before the Commission. 
In general, though, this important area is one in which constructive 
suggestions for concrete measures are anxiously awaited.
10A
-  63 -
Having now completed the analysis of the impact which 
adherence to the Banjul Charter might have on the legal systems 
of the three states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, it is 
now in order to turn to the two U(\l Covenants for the purpose Df 
undertaking a similar analysis.
The Two International Covenants
The analysis here may be briefer than that just completed for 
the Banjul Charter. The principal reason is that, insofar as 
the two UN Covenants - the one on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, and the other on Civil and Political Rights - overlap 
the Banjul Charter the analysis has already been undertaken and 
need not be repeated. It is only to the extent that the two 
Covenants contain rights not found in the Banjul Charter that 
further exploration is necessary.
(A) State of Ratification of UN Human Rights Conventions 
by Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
The most important point to note for present purposes is that 
none of the three states being considered here is a party to 
either D f  the UN Covenants. In fact, Botswana and Swaziland 
both have rather poor records of ratification of UN human 
rights instruments. Lesotho's record is significantly better.
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The following table lists the UIM human rights instruments 
to which each of the three was a party as at 1 July 1981:
Botswana: (1) International Convention on the
Elimination of All Farms of Racial 
Discrimination (1966).
(2) Convention Relation to the Status 
of Refugees (1951).
(3) Protocol to (3) (1967).
(A) Convention Relating to the Status 
of Statesless Persons (195A).
Lesotho: (1) Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(ma).
(2) International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1966).
(3) Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951).
(A) Protocol to (3) (1967).
(5) Convention on the Political Rights 
of Women (1953).
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CS) Slavery Convention (1926).
(7) Protocol Amending (6) (1953).
(8) Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
5imilar to Slavery (1956).
Swaziland: (1) International Convention on the
elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1966).
(2) Protocol to the Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (1967).
(3) Convention on the Political Rights 
of Women (1953).
In addition to the above information, it might be noted that Lesotho 
has signed, but not yet ratified, the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979).
(B) Implication for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland of 
adherence to the International Covenants
(a) International Covenant on Civil and Political R ights 
The right to life
The Banjul Charter, as noted above, does provide 
protection for the life and integrity of the 
person. It does not, however, say anything 
expressly about the imposition of the death
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penalty. This omission is somewhat surprising, in that 
this area of civil liberties law is one in which Third World 
countries have taken a leading role (most notably in Latin 
America) while the world's most (professedly) civil liberta­
rian states, the United States, has been notably backward.
It might have been thought that the death penalty is something 
that would have been of particular concern in Africa because 
of the fact that South Africa, the continent's perpetual paradigm 
of gross and persistent human rights violations, is one of the 
world's most lavish indulgers in the death penalty (inflicted 
overwhelmingly disproportionately on its black population).
For some reason, however, the drafters of the Banjul Convention 
chose to let pass this opportunity to take the lead in an 
important area of civil liberties.
The protection which the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights affords in respect of the death penalty is itself 
rather modest. Article 6(2) provides that the death sentence 
may be imposed "only for the most serious crimes in accordance 
with the law in force at the time of the commission of the 
crime . . . . " There can be little doubt that the criterion 
of seriousness is to be judged not in accordance with the domestic 
law of the state concerned, but rather in terms of the Covenant's 
own standards.
In this area, the European Human Rights Convention affords 
less protection: like the Banjul Charter, it omits all express
mention of the subject. The American Human Rights Convention, 
on the other hand, is more liberal than the Civil and Political 
Covenant. It provides, in Article A (2), that the application 
of the death penalty "shall not be extended to crimes to which 
it does not presently apply."
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Adherence to the Civil and Political Covenant by the three 
states under consideration would not impose any undue burdens 
in this area. All three states retain the death penalty, but 
only for crimes which would probably be deemed to fall into 
the "serious" category.
Forced Labour (Article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant)
Here is another important omission from the Banjul Charter,
surprising in light of the suffering to which many African
peoples were exposed in this regard during the colonial 
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period. Article 8 of the Covenant is careful to state that 
there are certain forms of involuntary labour which shall not 
be deemed to be prohibited under this head: service performed
by a person under detention, compulsory military service, 
services required during emergencies, and any work or service 
which forms part of "normal civil obligations." These same four 
exceptions are found in the European and the American Human 
Rights Conventions (Articles A and 6 respectively).
In the three states under study, there have been no significant 
reports of allegations of forced labour. This article therefore 
should pose no difficulties to the three states should they 
ratify the Covenant.
Deprivation of Liberty (Article 9 of the Civil and Political Covenant).
In this area, both the Banjul Charter and the states of Lesotho 
and Swaziland fall below the standards set by the Civil and Political 
Covenant. For one thing, Article 9(2) requires that a person who 
is arrested is entitled to be informed at the time of the reason for
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the arrest. There is some uncertainty as to what this pro­
vision means, in the case of legislation like the security 
laws of either of those two states. Consider, for instance, 
section 32 of the Internal Security (General) Act 1982 of Lesotho, 
which authorises any member of the police force to arrest 
without warrant "a person whom he reasonably suspects to be 
. . . concerned in subversive activity." If Article 9(2) 
were to be followed, would the arresting officer, in order 
to comply, only have to inform the detainee that the detention 
was because of suspicion of concern in a subversive activity?
Or would he have to go further and give the grounds of his 
suspicion? Similarly, in the case of Swaziland, would a 
person subject to preventive detention only have the right 
to be told that the Prime Minister deems it to be in the 
"public interest" to detain him, or would he be entitled to 
an explanation of how the minister came to be of that opinion?
Judging by the language Df Article 9(2) alone, it would 
appear probable that detainees would have to be given no more 
than the proximate cause of their arrest i.e., to be told 
under what authority the arrest was taking place. In the 
ordinary course of investigation into criminal activity, 
it would perhaps seem to be placing a rather heavy burden on 
police forces to present the prosecution's case in miniature, 
as it were, each time that they made an arrest. It is necessary, 
though, particularly in the area of detention under security 
laws, to look beyond the mere proximate cause of the arrest.
Where the domestic law allows detention for reasons that are 
so general as not to amount to reasons at all from the point 
of view of detainees - and such is the case with the security 
legislation of both Lesotho and Swaziland - then the spirit, 
if not the letter of Article 9(2) is being frustrated. States 
should not be allowed to flout their international obligations
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in this way. Therefore, it is submitted, the requirement of 
Article 9(2) should be interpreted to mean that a person when 
being arrested must be informed in reasonable detail of the 
specific conduct in which he engaged which led to his arrest.
On this standard, the law of all three countries, as set 
forth in their respective constitutions, was once at least broadly 
in line with Article 9(2). In Lesotho and Swaziland, though, 
the constitutional protections are now no longer operative, 
so that no domestic legal safeguards remain against the rigour 
of the security laws. The security legislation would require 
amendment on the part of these two governments. In Botswana, 
in contrast, the constitutional guarantee of the right to be 
informed of the reasons for one's arrest is still outstanding. 
There has been no indication from the case law of that state 
that any change would have to be made in order to accord with 
Article 9(2) of the Covenant.
Another extremely important measure of protection for 
detainees which is present in the UN Covenant (in Article 9(A) 
but which is lacking in the Banjul Charter is the right of a 
detainee to test the lawfulness of his detention. What this 
principle entails, as was discussed above in connection with 
Article 7 of the Banjul Charter, is that a person would have 
the right to have an impartial tribunal determine whether his 
detention was or was not authorised by the law. Under this 
principle tbe law itself is not subject to challenge, the 
only question being whether the law has been followed, however 
harsh that law may be in substance.
It would appear that all three states in question do allow 
for the testing of the lawfulness of detention in this sense,
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although there may be some doubt in the case of Swaziland. There
certainly is no doubt regarding Botswana, where the principle
is enshrined in the still-functioning constitution. Even in
Lesotho, where the substantive law is much more harsh, the Sello 
106
case (discussed above) firmly established that the then- 
existing security legislation did not purport to remove this 
right to test the lawfulness of detention. The 1902 legislation, 
even though it did reverse some aspects of the Sello decision, 
did not affect this vital principle.
In Swaziland, the position is rather less clear, although 
107the Walker and Forbes case provides a strong indication that 
the courts there will scrutinize the actions of the authorities 
to ensure that legislation is complied with. It would appear, 
then, that all three states meet the standard set by Article 9(A) 
of the Civil and Political Covenant, notwithstanding the wide 
disparities which exist in the substance of the laws which the 
courts scrutinise.
Article 9(5) of the Civil and Political Covenant provides, 
as again the Banjul Charter does not, that a person who has been 
arrested or detained unlawfully shall have an enforceable right 
to compensation. This guarantee also was placed into the inde­
pendence constitutions of all three of the states being studied.
It is still, therefore, the law in Botswana.
In Lesotho, it still clearly is passible to obtain damages
for malicious arrest on the part of the police, notwithstanding
100the suspension of the constitution. The common law survives 
in this area. It would seem that the same would be the case in 
Swaziland, although there is presently a lack of specific authority 
on the subject.
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There is an ambiguity in Article 9(5) of the Civil and
Political Covenant, in that it does not state against whom the
enforceable right to compensation must lie. It is therefore
uncertain whether it will be sufficient for compliance with the
article if the action lies against only the officer who effects
the arrest, or whether there must be a right of action against
the government as well as in all cases in which an officer acts
within the apparent scope of his authority. It is submitted
that, in the interest of making Article 9(5) effective, an
action must lie against the government in all such cases. On
109this principle, the Monare case would have to be overturned
either by decision or by statute in order to bring the Lesotho 
law into compliance with the Covenant.
In sum, the law of the three countries concerned requires 
some clarification, at a minimum, in this area if Article 9(5) 
is to be complied with. Once this clarification has been effected 
and the uncertainties concerning Article 9(5) itself resolved, 
it may -well be that changes in the law of the countries will 
be necessary here.
Rights of prisoners (Article 10 of the Civil and Political Covenant)
This subject is one which receives no attention in either the Banjul 
Charter or the independence constitutions of the three states in 
question. The obligations under Article 10, however, are of only 
the most modest and general kind. Detainees, according to Article 
10(1), must be "treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person." It is also set down that 
the aim of the penitentiary system should be "reformation and 
social rehabilitation" (Article 10(3)). The only specific
-  72 -
requirements are the separation of juveniles from adults, and 
the separation (save in "exceptional circumstances") persons 
who were merely accused of crimes should be separated from 
those who had been convicted. Presumably, persons who were 
not even accused of crimes, but were detained either preventi­
vely (as is possible under the Swaziland legislation) or on 
mere suspicion of concern with subversive activities (as is 
possible in Lesotho) would be confined with persons accused 
rather than with persons convicted.
Imprisonment for breach of contract (Article 11 of the Civil 
and Political Covenant)
A provision to this effect is a standard item in human rights 
instruments, even though it does not appear in the Banjul Charter. 
None of the three countries being studied allows imprisonment 
on this ground, although all of them allow imprisonment for 
disobedience of lawful orders of courts. Ratification of the 
Civil and Political Covenant would therefore pose no difficulties 
in this respect.
Right to a fair trial (Article 14 of the Civil and Political 
Covenant)
It is distinctly odd that the Banjul Charter does not expressly 
provide for the right to a fair trial in general, but only for 
(as the discussion above noted) the right to have one's "cause 
heard" (Article 7(1)). In addition to this general point, 
it should be noted that there are a number of specific aspects 
of fair trials which are provided for in Article 1A but which 
a lacking in the Banjul Charter.
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Article 1A of the UN Covenant also contains an express 
provision for a right to an interpreter, in the event that the 
defendant cannot speak or understand the language used in the 
court. The omission of this item from the Banjul Charter is 
puzzling. In light of the great variety of cultures and languages 
which often co-exist within African countries, one would have 
thought that a guarantee of the right to an interpreter would 
be particularly appropriate. Even in states as relatively 
ethnically homogenous as the three in question, the problem 
arises, because the language of the judicial system is English, 
which is not the vernacular language of any of the three 
states.
The problem which has arisen in this area in the three 
countries has not been so much the failure to provide an inter­
preter during the trial as the failure (often due to lack of 
of resources) to provide an impartial interpreter during the 
earlier stages of the inquiry. This difficulty has manifested 
itself in the case law of both Botswana and Lesotho. Botswana
in particular has shown itself to be very sensitive to this
110
problem. The case of Malatsi \J. State held very firmly
that the constitutional right to an interpreter includes the
the right to an unprejudiced interpreter. (In this case,
one of the prosecution witnesses had done the interpreting).
In light of that judgement, it is not clear what the status
111is of the earlier case of Mokwena \J. State, which concerned 
police acting qs interpreters. The court in that case stated 
that such a practice was not desirable, but conceded that it 
was sometimes unavoidable. Even the Mokwena court, though, 
held that a police official who was involved in the particular 
case in question should not act as the interpreter. It appears 
probable, in light of this line of authority, that Botswana 
is basically in compliance with Article 1A of the Covenant in 
this respect.
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In Lesotho, the position is basically the same. In the 
case of John Motloheloa \J. Rex,^^he prosecutor had done the 
translating before the magistrate. The court held that this 
procedure was wrong and quashed the conviction. The more 
recent case of Rex V. Moleleki is to much the same effect: 
that magistrates should never double as translators. It 
appears that Lesotho, like Botswana, is basically in compliance 
with the UIM Covenant on this matter.
There is apparently no line of case law in Swaziland
on the subject of the right to an interpreter. It is therefore
not passible to say at this stage what changes in the law of
that country, if any, might prove necessary to comply with the
Article 1A right to an interpreter.
Article 1A(3)(g) concerns a very fundamental right indeed 
far defendants in criminal proceedings - protection from self- 
incrimination. The American Human Rights Convention also 
contains this protection, although the European one does 
not, nor does the Banjul Charter. The protection did appear 
in the independence constitutions of the three states being 
considered.
Direct consideration of the question of the compelling
of a defendant to provide evidence against himself has been
very uncommon in the three countries. The Botswana case of 
1 ^
State I/. Modukwe, however, did consider the issue in connection with 
a prosecution for unlawful possession of diamonds under the 
Precious Stones Industry Protection Act. The defendant in 
that case, upon his apprehension, swallowed the diamonds.
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He was then held by the police for six days, without a warrant, 
and given a stomach purge, the purpose being to recover the 
diamonds when they emerged in the defendant's excrement. The 
court held that in the circumstances, the defendant had been 
compelled to give evidence against himself. This decision 
is consistent with the Article 1A guarantee against self- 
incrimination. It may even go further than Article 1A requires, 
although a decision one way or the other on that point should 
have no effect on the willingness or ability of Botswana to 
adhere to the Civil and Political Covenant.
Article 1A(6) of the Ul\l Covenant provides for a right of 
compensation in the case of a wrongful conviction. The American 
Human Rights Convention also provides for such a right, although 
neither the European Convention nor the Banjul Charter covers 
this question. None of the three states under consideration 
here provides for compensation in such a case. Therefore all 
three would have to make changes in their local law if they 
were to become parties to the Covenant.
The provision in the UN Covenant concerning double jeopardy
is of some interest, in light of the Swaziland case of Rex \J 
115A.K. Hlatswayo. The defendant in that case was charged with 
and convicted of assault. Some time after that, the victim 
died, whereupon the defendant was charged with culpable 
homicide (which is, basically, the Roman-Dutch law equivalent 
of manslaughter in the English common law). The court in 
Swaziland held that this second prosecution was permissible.
The reason lay in the conception of double jeopardy as it was 
expressed in the Swaziland constitution (which, however, had 
been "repealed" before the case in question). Section 8(5) of 
the constitution had set out the basic requirement for double
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jeopardy: it held that a person could not be tried for an 
offence of which he had already been acquitted "or for any 
other criminal offence of which he could have been convicted 
at the trial for that offence . . . "  Since the victim of the 
assault had still been alive at the time of the first trial, 
the offence of culpable homicide (which required the death 
of the victim) was not an "offence of which he could have 
been convicted at the earlier trial . . . "
In terms of the Swaziland c o n c e p t i o n  of what double jeopardy 
is, the decision would seem to be a correct, if rather harsh, 
one. It would also, apparently, be consistent with the UN 
Covenant provision on double jeopardy, which is actually 
more limited than the one in the Swaziland constitution:
Article 1A(7) of the Covenant provide no more than that a 
defendant cannot be tried or punished again "for an offence 
for which he has already been finally convicted. . ." A 
better approach toward the whole concept of double jeopardy 
would be to forbid a second prosecution for any offence based 
on the same set of facts which had formed the basis of a 
previous conviction. Such is not, however, the present 
state of international human rights law. Harsh though 
it may sometimes be, as in the Hlatshayo case, the Swaziland 
law on double jeopardy is consistent with the requirements 
of the Civil and Political Covenant.
In Botswana and Lesotho, there is not, apparently, any 
case law on this subject. Since the double jeopardy provisions 
of both constitutions are basically the same as that in 
Swaziland, it is reasonable to conclude that in those two 
states as well, there is no difficulty with ratification of 
the Covenant in this area.
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R i gh t of Privacy (Article 17 of the Civil and Political Covenant)
Neither the Banjul Charter nor the independence constitutions 
of the three countries being studied contains a right of privacy 
as such, although the three constitutions do contain protection 
against arbitrary search and entry. In Botswana, these 
guarantees still exist. In Lesotho, however, they have been 
gravely undermined by the security legislation, which 
confers the most sweeping powers of entry and search upon 
the police. Section 27(1) of the Internal Security (General)
Act 1982 grants to any member of the police force of the rank 
of sergeant or above the right "without warrant (to) enter 
premises or any other place, including a dwelling house ... 
for the purpose of ascertaining" whether it contains arms 
or explosives. There is no requirement at all of any belief, 
reasonable or otherwise, on the part of the officer that 
such materials might be on the premises. Section 27(2) of 
the same act gives similarly unlimited powers to any member 
of the police force to search persons for arms or explosives.
Again, there is no requirement that the police have the slightest 
suspicion that such might actually be the case. Clearly this 
Lesotho legislation is inconsistent with Article 17 of the UN 
Covenant, which protects people against "arbitrary . . . inter­
ference with . . . privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . "
Advocacy of racial hatred (Article 20(2) of the Civil and Political 
Covenant
It has been noted above that all three of the states under 
consideration are parties to the UN Convention on Racial 
Discrimination, and that all three have legislation forbidding 
the propagation of racial hatred. It has also been noted above
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that the Banjul Charter does not require states, expressly at 
any rate, to legislate against the advocacy of racial hatred.
This provision of the Covenant should provide no difficulty
for those states which might wish to ratify it.
The right to form trade unions (Article 22 of the Civil and
Political Covenant)
While this right is accorded in all three states its full
116
ramifications and implications are in practice not tolerated.
The right to marry and found a family (Article 23 of the Civil 
and Political Covenant)
There are no obstacles here to the ratification of the Covenant 
on the part of the three countries being studied.
Right of the child (Article 2A of the Civil and Political Covenant)
The basic right, as set forth in Article 2A(1) of the Covenant,
is the right of every child to "such measures of protection as
are required by his status as a minor on the part of his family,
society and the state." The Covenant, hardly surprisingly,
is not at all specific on how these three entities —  the
family, society, and the state - are to divide up the responsibilities
towards children.
- 79 -
Until there is some case law on this subject under the 
Covenant, it will not be possible to say with any certainty 
precisely what changes might have to be made in the law of any 
of the three states being considered. For now, it would 
probably be safe to assume, in the absence of any evidence 
to the contrary, that the three countries are presently doing 
enough in this area to comply with the requirements of this 
article.
Rights of minorities (Article 27 of the Civil and Political Covenant)
The three countries being considered here are singularly fortunate 
in being very largely free of ethnic and tribal animosities of the 
kind that have tragically beset so many of the states of Africa. 
Accordingly, it would appear probable that none will have any 
difficulties with this article in the event of ratification of 
the Covenant.
The UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
This discussion above, it may be recalled, concluded that by 
their very nature, economic, social, and cultural rights were 
not suitable for litigation on their own, separate and apart 
from civil and political rights, but that they properly 
formed a component of those human rights which commonly, 
but misleadingly, are called civil and political rights; as 
if to imply that even those rights could truly be viewed 
on their own, in isolation from the Mreal world". Insofar 
as an attempt is made, as it is to some extent in the Banjul 
Charter but even more so with the UM Covenant, to abstract 
the economic, social, and cultural element of human rights 
and treat it in isolation, the only truly legal obligation 
on the states concerned can be to make a good faith effort
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progressively to advance the rights concerned. Consequently, 
the only issue in this area which is litigable in the traditional 
sense of that term, is the presence or absence on the part of 
the state of that good faith effort. The presence or absence 
of solid results cannot be decisive.
It is therefore the case that there can be practically no 
"risk" for the states which are the abject of this study in the 
ratification of this instrument, if by "risk" one means a risk 
of having a claim successfully brought against it by another 
state party. Individuals have no standing under this Covenant, 
as they do under the Banjul Charter, to bring petitions against 
states. All this is not to say, of course, that the three states, 
in becoming parties to this Covenant, would not thereby be 
assuming legal obligations. They would be under the basic 
obligation - which is fully binding legally - set forth in 
Article 2(1) to "undertake . . .  to take steps . . . with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the . . . Covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures." That may well be what the states are now doing, 
or in any event attempting to do. The important point is that, 
upon ratification of the Covenant, they will be legally bound 
under international law to continue in those efforts.
At this point, there remains only to go briefly through 
the UIM Covenant and to point out the ways in which it goes 
beyond the Banjul Charter.
The right to work (Article 7 of the Economic, Social and Cultural
Covenant)
This provision of the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant is 
both more clearly drafted and more detailed than its counterpart
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in the Banjul Charter 15). UJhen the Banjul Charter holds that 
"Every individual shall have the right to work under equitable 
and satisfactory conditions . . . it is not clear whether 
there is intended to be a right to be employed, or merely a 
right to enjoy the stipulated conditions _i£ one is employed.
The Covenant seems to opt for the latter approach, with its 
guarantee of "just and favourable conditions of work ".
The Covenant has provisions for fair remuneration, which 
the Banjul Charter does not. It also provides for a right to 
promotion on the basis of no other grounds than seniority and 
competence. It also makes a general provision for leisure 
time.
The right to form and join trade unions (Article 8 of the Covenant)
This subject has been touched upon before and need not be repeated 
here.
The right to social security (Article 9 of the Covenant)
The Banjul Charter contains nothing of this kind, possibly because 
so many of the member states of the OAU are very poor countries 
which in their present state of under-development cannot afford 
social security systems.
Rights pertaining to the family (Article 10 of the Covenant)
An interesting provision which the Covenant provides for is 
special protection for mothers for a reasonable period before
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and after childbirth. It also contains a restriction on child 
labour which is absent from the Banjul Charter.
Right to an adequate standard of living (Article 11 of the Covenant)
A provision like this one is a rather conspicuous absentee from 
the Banjul Charter. One might have thought that such a right 
would be upper: most in the minds of drafters with a special 
interest in economic and social rights. The Banjul Charter 
also lacks any provision analogous to the Article 11(2) previ­
sion on freedom from hunger.
Rights to an education (Article 13 and ^  of the Covenant)
Here again, the Covenant is the more detailed document, by a 
consideration margin. Particularly important is its explicit 
mention of the goal of making primary education both compul­
sory and free.
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CONCLUSION
It would be wrong to contend that the Banjul Charter on Human 
and Peoples' Rights is one of the international community's 
more accomplished pieces of draftsmanship. Rather, it is a mix 
of caution and extravagance, of quite traditional common sense 
and wild bombast. In the months and years to come (assumihg, 
that is, that the document does win the acceptance of the 
African states), it no doubt will often be said that the most 
significant fact about the Charter is that it exists at all.
If there is any single lesson to be learned from this analysis 
of the Charter just undergone, it is that that kind of attitude 
is wrong. The mere existence of an African regional human 
rights machinery is not enough, not by a long shot. This analysis 
has uncovered that even Botswana, one of Africa's few havens of 
apparent liberal democracy, falls short in a number of respects 
of even the modest standards which the Banjul Charter sets in the 
civil and political field. As imperfect as it is, the Charter 
has something that it can teach to almost every state. To fail 
to do so would be a tragic waste.
□ne can state this last point somewhat more generally and 
point out that the mere existence of legal norms can never be 
sufficient. Until those norms can become part of the living law 
of the people they are meant to serve and benefit, they can hardly
be hailed as a great service to mankind. In this area, more than
in any other, there is cause for worry about the Charter. There
is the fear that those parts of the Charter which are drafted in
the most sweeping fashion may frighten some states away from 
ratification. The great experiment may yet be stillborn.
There is of course some danger in expecting the Charter to 
do too much, although the nature of that danger is often seriously
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misunderstood. Clearly, it is unwise to expect the entry into 
force of the Charter,should such ever occur, to work an instant 
and profound transformation over the human rights landscape 
of Africa. But the most important concerns about the Charter 
are, one might say, ones of quality rather than of quantity.
That is, the importance of the Charter lies not in the 
quantum of change which it might, or might not wreak, but 
rather in the kinds of attitudes which it succeeds, or 
fails to engender in the hearts and minds of government 
officials, lawyers, and ultimately, the common people of 
Africa. The scholars, lawyers, and people of Africa must 
not become fixated on the Charter as a kind of all encompassing 
human rights panacea. Rather, the Charter should become 
a mechanism whereby the various states and peoples of Africa 
constantly exchange experiences, ideas and hopes with one 
another.
We have observed in the course of this portion of the study 
that in some ways the laws of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
have something to learn from the Banjul Charter; in other ways 
they have things to teach it. In any event, it is vital not 
to lose sight of the human rights process generally as one of 
constant teaching and learning in which the roles of teacher 
and learner are in a state of constant flux. This essay, 
of course, has been concerned with the extent to which the 
law of the states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland "measures 
up" to that of the Banjul Charter. With great frequency, though, 
the meaning of the Charter itself has been greatly in question.
In such cases, where else is there to look for guidance than the 
experience of other regional systems and, just as importantly, 
principles that can be gleaned from the domestic laws of the 
states which may, or may not, be measuring up to the standards
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of that. The African Charter will truly have succeeded when 
it stops being seen as a kind of overlord and begins to be 
viewed as an instrument, as a more or less efficient device 
for stimulating a constant flux or interplay of ideas 
about human rights which will gradually seep more and more 
into the daily lives of the people of Africa.
Ultimately, then, this study has not been about what 
the states of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland can learn 
from the Banjul Charter. It has been about what all of 
us can learn about human rights generally from the inter­
play between those three countries and the African Charter.
In the final analysis in the human rights field, all are
learners and all are teachers.
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RIGHTS (I. Brownlie ed. , 2nd ed. 1981), at 2A3-65.
2. For the text of which, see _icl. at 391-A16.
3. See Article 63(3) of the Charter.
A. For the text of which, see BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 118-27.
5. For the text of which, see _ici. at 128-A5. This 
Covenant is accompanied by aw Optional Protocol 
(for the text of which, see id. at 1A6-A9) 
concerning the right of individual petition vis-a-vis 
states parties.
6 . The Charter does not require, as the European Human
Rights Convention does, that those who file communica­
tions must themselves claim to be victims of the 
violations which they point out. It is therefore 
passible, under the Banjul Charter, for individuals 
and non-governmental organizations to play a sort 
of ombudsman role.
7. The inclusion of rights of peoples in the Banjul Charter
is not wholly without precedent. Both of the UN Covenants, 
for instance (see notes A and 5 supra),included the 
right of peoples to self-determination. What is unique 
about the Banjul Charter is the prominence which it 
accords to the concept of peoples' rights.
8 . See generally E. KANNYO, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS (1980); LU. liJEINSTEIN, AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1980); 111. CUBBERLEY, PROMOTION AND 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: REGIONAL ARRANGE­
MENTS (1980); and 0.' LUELCH. The O.A.U. and Human Rights: 
Towards a New Definition, 19 J. MOA. AFF. STUD. A01
(1981).
- 87 -
9. It is true that in the section on interpretation of the 
Charter by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights, Article 61 states that as a subsidiary measure 
to determine the principles of law to apply, the 
Commission should consider "African practices consistent 
with international norms on human and peoples' rights." 
The reference, however, appears to be to African state 
practice, and not to the customary law of the various 
indigenous African nations.
10. For example, it appears to be the case that in the 
area of the rights of women, some of the African 
customary law systems were more advanced than the 
Raman-Dutch law or the English common law.
11. It may be noted, however, that there is a mechanism 
for amending the Banjul Charter, set out in Article 
68.
12. On the trade union movement in Africa generally,
see U. AINJAIMABA, THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN AFRICA: 
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (1979).
13. On this subject generally, see ETHNICITY IN MODERN 
AFRICA (E. du Toit ed. 1978); and V. 0L0RUNS0LA, THE 
POLITICS OF CULTURAL SUBNATIONALISM IN AFRICA (1972).
1A. See generally, INTERNATIONAL COMMON OF JURISTS,
AFRICAN CONFERENCE ON THE RULE OF LAUJ, LAGOS, NIGERIA, 
JAN, 3-7, 1961: A REPORT ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONFERENCE (1961). For the text of the Law of Lagos, 
see BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, 
at A26-3A.
15. See Generally Martin, The Ombudsman in Zambia, 15 
J. MOD. AFR. STUD. (1977).
- 88 -
16. See note 14 supra.
17. These are the following: The right to life; the right
not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; the right not to 
be heTd in slavery or servitude; the right not to be 
imprisoned for failure to fulfill a contractual 
obligation; the right not to be convicted under 
retroactive criminal legislation; the right to 
recognition as a person before the law; and the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion.
1Q. Selection of the 3 countries due to general and 
frequent practice.
19. The European Human Rights Convention contains a
provision corresponding to Article 2 of the Banjul, 
but not to Article 3. The American Human Rights 
Convention is iust the opposite. It contains a 
provision analogous to Article 3, but not hci 
Article 2.
2D. Such structural dualism in legal systems is not 
uncommon in Africa.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. 1970-76 S.L.R. 58.
23. See the text at note 91 infra.
24. This understanding is crucial to any meaningful inter­
pretation of the law.
25. See, for example, the unreported Lesotho case Rex \]. Pesa 
Mokhope, CRI/T/19/76 (1976).
- 69 -
26. On the law relating to "pointing out" generally, see 
the Botswana case of State W. Lekgetho, Rev. Case 
No. 67 of 1902.
27. 1960-70 B.L.R. 129.
20. Sometimes the suggestions have been slightly bizarre, 
as in the case of Rex \J. Majake Molupe and Others 
1900 1 L.L.R. 112, in which the judge suggested 
that whenever a detainee indicated a desire to 
confess, he should be released immediately to the 
household of a "respectable and prominent member 
of the community" where he would wait until he 
had truly made up his mind as to whether he wished 
to proceed with the confession. One wonders how 
the "prominent and respectable members of the community" 
would take the inauguration of such a programme. For 
slightly more down-to-earth suggestions, relating tD 
scrupulous medical attention to detainees, see Rex U. 
Faku, CRI/TA7/70.
29. Concerning this legislation generally, see Cross 
reference to Part A.
30. Case No. S.0A/1979.
31. 2 CDMP. & INT'L L. J. SOUTHERN AFRICA 3A0 (1969).
32. One must say "allegedly" in the context of this
case, since the court never passed on the detainee's 
original claims of mistreatment.
33. CIU/APN/216/01.
3k. See the case of Tyrer \J. United Kingdom (Eur. Ct. Human 
Rights, 1970).
-  90 -
35. Rev. Case No.A of 1982.
36. It should be noted here that the judge also expressed 
himself as opposed to punishment that were so 
excessively harsh as to render the recipient 
embittered and hardened.
37. Rex. \l. David IMkofo and Auqustinus Mokoteli 1967-70 
L.L.R. 383.
38. A point which figured prominently in the Tyrer case, 
supra note 3A.
39. Rex. V. Mohlouoa Tsehlana, Rev. Case l\lo. 157/77
(1977).
AO. Rex U. N.T. Zwane, Rev. Case No.8 of 1973.
A1. Stephen Kunene U. Rex, CRI. Case No. 112/78 (1978).
A2. Rex \I. Uusi Nkambule, Crim. Case No. 21/81.
A3. The potential threat this represents to free expression, 
and the fear it inculcates is considerable.
AA. Cases Nos. 3/78 and 6/78 (1978).
A5. 1971-73 L.L.R. 296.
A6. In this connection, see also Lebenya Makakole U. Commissioner 
of Police and Solicitor-General, CIV/APN/5A/82.
A7. 1980 1 L.L.R. 158.
AB. Jck at 172.
A9. _Id. at 169.
50. CIU/APIM/32/82.
51. Id. at A.
52. See note A6 supra.
53. _Id. at 6-7.
5A. For a comparison of the position under the Southern 
African Terrorism Act, as opposed to the Lesotho 
Legislation, see the Sello case, supra note A7, at 
170-72.
55. This obviously represents a serious hindrance to open, 
unbiased and fair juridical practice.
56. CRI/T/20/80 (1981).
-  91 -
57. The Law of Lagos of 1961 favoured affording such a 
right to detainees, even if not necessarily through 
the ordinary court system. See note 1A supra.
58. State V. Moagi and Another 1968-70 8.L.R. 198.
59. Phenya Manyokho and Motlatsi Liphang \J. Regina 
1963-66 H.C.T.L.R. 30.
- 92 -
60. 1968-70 B.R.L. 158.
61. A COMP. & INT'L L. 0. SOUTHERN AFRICAN 118 (1971).
62. As in the Botswana case of Makwekwe \J. State, Crim. 
App. No. 10A (1981).
63. See the text at note 10A infra.
6A. Crim. App. No. A7 of 1982.
65. 197A 1 E.L.R. 98.
6 6 . _Id.
67. See, for example, Joseph Jasone U. Rex, CRI/A/37/77
(1978); and Mahlala and Others V. Rex, CRI/A/19-21/82
(1982).
68. 1980 1 L.L.R. 1A6.
69. Id. at 1A8.
70. Rex VI. A. M. Dlamini, S. 12/76.
71. On the difficulties which Jehovah's Witnesses have 
encountered in Malawi;see Amnesty International, 
"Persecution of Jehovan's Witnesses in Malawi"
(1978).
72. H.C. Rev. Case No. 261/75.
-  93 -
73. H.C. Rev. Case IMo. 337/75.
7*+. H.C. Rev. Case No. 241/8 1.
75. 1975 1 B.L.R. 46.
76. 1972 1 B.L.R. 29.
77. 1975 1 B.L.R. 93.
78. 1967-70 L.L. 377.
79. Id. at 381-82.
80. 1970-76 S.L.R. 396.
81. 1963-69 S.L.R. 38.
82. 1970-76 S.L.R. 171.
For a landmark case in the European system on the 
treatment of contempt of court, see the Sunday Times 
Case (Eur. Ct. of Human Rights, 1979), the text 
of which is reproduced in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 266-300.
84. MISC/APN/1/81 and CIV/APN/34/81 (1981).
85. 1968-70 B.L.R. 115.
-  9k -
8 6 . CII//APN/21/81 (1982).
87. An area of relative dormancy in the legal systems of 
the 3 countries.
8 8 . 1967-70 L.L.R. 237.
89. It should be noted, though, that the term "election" 
is not used in the Banjul Charter, in contrast to the 
European Human Rights Convention, Article 3 of the 
First Protocol of which requires states parties to 
"undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot . . . "
90. The second paragraph of the article does use the word 
"property," but not in connection with a right of 
property on the part of individuals. The reference 
is to the "right of a State to . . control the use of 
property . . . ."
91. See generally M. GAMJI, THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: PROBLEMS, POLICY PROGRESS.
92. CRI/A/AA/79 (1979).
93. Id.
9A. Again an area of dormancy in spite of current global 
academic and popular interest in the subject.
95. On the right to development generally, see Mbaye,
"Le Development et les Driots de 1 1 Homme: 'Rapport 
Introductif," REV SENEGALAISE DE DROIT 19 de Kadt,
Some Basic Questions on Human Rights and Development,
8 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 97 (1980); Chouraqui "Report of 
the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right
_ 95 _
to Development," U.N. Doc. E/CN.A/1^+89 (1982);
RAPPORT GENERAL DU CQLLOQUE SUR LES DROITS DE 
L' HOMME ET DE DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIQUE EIM AFRIQUE 
FRANCOPHONE (1978). See also the folloujing papers 
given at the Seminar on Lau and Human Rights and 
Development, May 2A-2B, Gaborone, Botswana: Alston
& Eide, Discussion Paper Prepared For the African 
Seminar on Human Rights and Development; Dimitrijevic, 
Development as a Right; Kibola, Some Conceptual 
Aspects of Human Rights: The Basis for the Right
to Development in Africa; Makati, Law and Human 
Rights in National Development; Maope, Development 
and Legitimacy of Government in Lesotho; Nengwekhulu, 
The Meaning and Character of Development; Samson,
Human Rights and Development: ILO Approaches; Seek,
Relations between the Development and the Human Rights 
in Africa; Seidman, Human Rights, Law and Development; 
and Sharma, Compatibility of a Conciliatory Federal 
Political Framework and Development Planning: Some 
Tentative Formulations towards the Development of 
'Conflict Model' and 'Harmony Model'
96. See note 95 supra.
97. Quoted from U. LUEIIMSTEI(\J, supra note 8, at 57.
98. This expression is borrowed from the European Court 
of Human Rights case of Handyside V. United Kingdom
(1976).
99. Article 63(1) of the Charter.
100. CRI.T.S.53/78 (1978).
101. For the text of which, see BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 381-87.
102. Article 32(1) of the American Convention an Human 
Rights.
- 96 -
103. It is true that Article 56 of the Charter states that 
communications to the Commission shall be considered 
provided they meet the criteria set forth in that 
article. Those criteria, however, clearly relate 
to the necessary characteristics of the communication 
itself, not of the communicators.
104. The importance of this subject has been touched 
upon already. See the text at note 63 supra.
105. Considerable documentation on Forced Labour under 
colonialism exists.
106. See the text at note 47 supra.
107. See the text at note 44 supra.
108. See, for example, Tanki Fice \l. Lebamang Ntisa, 
Phethang Merafo and Sehehere Mare, CIV/T/108/76
(1977), which was a successful civil action 
against several police officers (not against 
the government, however) for malicious arrest.
109. The case of None Monare I/. Taylor and Government
Secretary of Basutoland 1967-76 L.L.R. 13, which 
held that if the government did not control the 
police officer in the exercise of his discretion 
to effect the arrest, then only the officer and 
not the government would be liable. The case 
followed the Rhodesian precedent of British South 
Africa Co. V. Crickmore 1921 A.D. 107.
110 Crim. App. Case No. 50/81 (1981).
111 1975 1 B.L.R. 24.
97
112. 1967-70 L.L.R. 300.
113. CRI/T/25/81 (1982).
11A. H.C. Rev. Case no. 117/80 (1981).
115. T.S. 12/77.
116. Generally a carrot and stick policy is employed to 
Trade Unions in Africa as a whole.
T h is  w ork is licensed under a 
Creative C o m m o n s
Attribution -  N oncom m erc ia l - N o D e riv s  3.0 L icense.
To  view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.Org/licenses/bv-nc-nd/3.0/
This is a download from the BLDS Digital Library on OpenDocs
h t t p : / / o p e n d o c s . i d s . a c . u k / o p e n d o c s /
i
® * V |n s t itu te  o f
Development Studies
